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ABSTRACT
 
Myth is made as a matter of daily course, underlying
 
life and giving it form. The form accepts whatever is put
 
into it, but changes it. This paradox: change combined with
 
stability, is the basis of all myth. Since it is the nature
 
of myth to change, then when it does, it breaks apart and
 
the new myth emerges from the old. The myth gives and it
 
takes away; it is a microcosm of our lives.
 
What is reassuring, however, is that the myth's form is
 
recognizable but at the same time always new. Cultures and
 
individuals do not know themselves until they shape their
 
experience into form (read myth) through language. And these
 
identities are made when myth provides us a form where we
 
recognize all our possible lives. We construct language
 
within the freedom of the myth and create ourselves around
 
this nothingness with our stock of language.
 
When students become aware of how myth-making creates
 
self in the writing classroom, this insight can help
 
motivate them to write. The pedagogy I envision is
 
democratic and organic. It balances product and process in a
 
constant forming and breaking apart of self in text. There
 
is no true text, only potential texts and selves. I want to
 
awaken students to this personal myth-making project for
 
their writing.
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1.id^TH-MAKING
 
Introduction to Myth, The Writer, and The Writing Classroom
 
At the beginning of In the American Grain William
 
Carlos Williams speaks in the voice of Red Eric, father of
 
Lief Ericson:
 
Rather the ice than their way: to take what is
 
mine by single strength, theirs by the crookedness
 
of their law. But they have marked me—even to
 
myself. Because I am not like them, I am evil. I
 
cannot get my hands on it: I, murderer, outlaw,
 
outcast even from Iceland. Because their way is
 
the just way and my way—the way of the kings and
 
my father—crosses them: weaklings holding
 
together to appear strong. But I am alone, though
 
in Greenland. (lAG 1)
 
Eric, the defiant pirate and marauder-King, on the run
 
from an encroaching Christian domesticity, snaps at the dogs
 
that follow. He is not sure of the way things are changing.
 
He knows he should lead because he is a king, but he cares
 
not for the direction he must go. And the others do not
 
follow to be his slaves; he has no power over them. He is
 
alone, which is good and bad: he is "in Greenland." One of
 
those wishful—thinking kind of places, such as the land for
 
tract homes in Florida in the 1920's that ended up to be
 
swamp. Yet, Eric is on the cusp of the new; he represents
 
something specific for Williams: the brashness of the new
 
  
and a nostalgia for the royal prerogative.
 
Yet-, to be "in Greenland," an ostensibly horrid place
 
of ice and unforgiving climate, is for Red Eric to
 
participate in an act of will that makes life possible.
 
There is no question but that he knows what Greenland is. He
 
also knows that he is already there in his own mind:
 
"alone." For Eric, being "ip Greenland" is the only thing he
 
can do.^ Greenland is also the ruse he perpetrates on those
 
who will follow, a kind of orientalism^ that will secure his
 
place in history. Eric sprays the stale perfume of the
 
anden regime toward the wilderness of America. The heady
 
odor of it is what Williams senses all around. He captures
 
it; writes it down in In The American Grain.
 
It is a commonplace to say that Williams is Eric
 
because he writes in his voice. There is no doubt we see
 
Eric more real in Williams' use of the first person
 
^ Red Eric's myth—making concocts a mythical land,
 
replacing the real Greenland of ice with this green land.
 
Then he acts on this myth (when he says he is "in
 
Greenland"), and by doing so, makes it real for those who
 
follow. Of course, those who did follow got to know the
 
"real" Greenland and kept going — traveling deeper into the
 
myth Red Eric had started. Williams is one of thes
 
travelers. Williams and others before him, rewrite the myth
 
of America by including Red Eric, remembering him as the
 
progenitor of the myth. It is ironic that Red Eric his son
 
Lief and his discovery of Vinland (America) were not known
 
about by Columbus. But it shows how the myth is continually
 
being remade.
 
No doubt this was early (four hundred years before the
 
Age of Exploration), but the lure of the Orient, its mystery
 
and promise of riches is contained in the name Greenland —
 
especially for those used to ice and snow.
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narrator. This doubling, this creating of personae, says
 
something about Williams and about America. In In The
 
American Grain Williams constructs his myth of America,
 
while he also constructs himself as an American.
 
Also, there is the sense that Williams is "alone" in an
 
America that may be metaphorically full of ice. And like
 
Eric, Williams fears that he "cannot get his hands on It."
 
He does the best he can by writing the words of Eric down
 
for us — by being the poet he is. And perhaps, by letting
 
Red Eric speak for him, it does allow Williams to get his
 
hands on it (America). Acquiring a voice like Eric's is an
 
act of faith for a writer; it must be renewed with every
 
line written.
 
I wish to emulate William's writer's faith in my own
 
writing here — in this thesis. I want to show how students
 
in the writing classroom might be able to "get their hands
 
on" the writing they will be asked to do. My premise is that
 
we are already myth-makers of extraordinary power but do not
 
know it. We are like the men and women who made (wrote) the
 
legendary myths that define our culture. On a smaller scale,
 
but in a no less important manner, we can learn to write our
 
own myths.
 
Myth-making gives us, as it did our ancient ancestors,
 
the ability to understand the world around us by naming it,
 
setting it up in narrative, and then, by living this story,
 
watch how it can change us. Writing allows us to do the work
 
of myth-making, while the writing process — when it
 
produces knowledge — motivates us to write. However, myth-

making as it relates to writing is easily misunderstood. It
 
is far subtler then it appears.
 
I want to be clear that my use of myth in this thesis
 
has nothing to do with archetypes or any particular myth. I
 
want to become aware of how myth-making is a tool for the
 
making of self. The making of self, as I will show with the
 
help of the German-Jewish critic Walter Benjamin, serves no
 
purpose in itself. But let us ignore this for a moment and
 
ask: what does it look like to make one's self?
 
It is difficult to know for sure. The stumbling block
 
has always been the notion that there was only one self,
 
some core to our being that we either knew or we did not
 
know. We could conceivably miss the chance to make a self or
 
discover our true self and languish (self—less) all of one's
 
life. I believe this is false. In this thesis I will argue
 
first of all, that myth-making shows us that there are many
 
versions of the same self; and secondly, by explaining myth
 
in this way it will allow us to see how students in the
 
writing classroom can make their writing more visionary and
 
at the same time more practical.
 
I begin my discussion of myth-making by describing myth
 
and how it has been used in art and society. Early in my
 
research I realized that there were many versions of most
 
myths. For example, the Theseus/Minotaur myth tells how
 
Theseus goes to Crete, kills the Minotaur, and then flees
 
with Ariadne, leaves her on a deserted island (Naxos), and
 
returns to Greece. But over the months of reading about myth
 
I found other versions of the Theseus myth, especially when
 
it came to what happened to Ariadne. Roberto Calasso recites
 
the variations:
 
Abandohed in Naxos, Ariadne was Shot dead by
 
Artemis's arrow; Dionysus ordered the killing and
 
stood watching, motionless. Or: Ariadne, hung
 
herself in Naxos, after being left by Theseus. Or:
 
pregnant by Theseus and shipwrecked in Cyprus, she
 
died there in childbirth. Or: Dionysus came to
 
Ariadne in Naxos, together with his band of
 
followers; they celebrated a divine marriage,
 
after which she rose into the sky, where we still
 
see her today amid the northern constellations. Or
 
.... (23)
 
So, there seems to be no reason to stick to the story. In
 
fact, those who are touched by the myth ter^d to "read" it in
 
a particular way and then change it. At the same time, this
 
process of myth—making comes up against a force, as strong
 
in society as the myth-making need, that wants to freeze the
 
story into some canonical form. Yet the myths are made to be
 
broken. We take the story and improvise it, tell it in a new
 
way so that it eventually breaks the old myth apart and lets
 
a new one be born.
 
In personal terms we experience this birth as a product
 
of our need for individuation. We also have an insatiable
 
desire to name this new birth. The way we do this is with
 
language, with story. We become authors and as the poet John
 
Berryman said: ... the subject [isl entirely hew, solely and
 
simply myself. Nothing else. A subject on which I am an
 
expert.'' We are all experts on ourselves — a fecund fund of
 
myth. A hotion our students are hard pressed to learn. But
 
what if they were to be given a method to learn to write
 
themselves? They might see all the possibilities, all the
 
geniuses of themselves.
 
I admit that this keening after self expression is not
 
new. Writing has always been seen as a way to describe the
 
author and those around him or her. The genesis of story is
 
the need of the storyteller to tell the "folk" who they are.
 
Yet to frame it more particularly I want to see myth-making
 
in the writing classroom in the issue of voice. As I
 
explain, near the end of this thesis, voice in the
 
contemporary writing classroom is a thorny issue. Various
 
writers:in Composition Studies explain the difficulty in
 
finding one's voice, knowing where it comes from, and
 
controlling it when it appears. Voice is most often mistaken
 
for what I call the "master scripts" of education. There Is
 
no denying these scripts. I do not want to argue, for
 
instance, that we must do away with the script we teach that
 
defines academic writing. Since I have been studying myth I
 
have become wary of ostracizing any coming to voice, for
 
vQice is a plural form. We do not have a singular voice; we
 
have as many voices as there are forms for our writing.
 
Therefore, where the voice comes from is not as important as
 
which voice I am using today and how well I can use it.
 
Finally, being multi-voiced is the essence of myth, the
 
reason why we should study how myth has been made, and why
 
it should be encouraged in the writing classroom. Myth-

making provides students and teachers with a method that
 
puts the act of creation firmly in the hands of the
 
individual. It allows the person to take control of the
 
writing-self and build a tower of voices that do not babel
 
at one another but can be turned on and used for whatever
 
purpose. This thesis is an encouragement to all the voices
 
inside of us; all the myths we are living and hope to live.
 
Briefly, before I turn to the my discussion of myth-

making I would like to deal with the notion I raised
 
earlier: why does the making of self serve no purpose? When
 
the Paris Review asked Philip Larkin why he wrote, he said:
 
The short answer is that you write because you
 
have to. if you rationalize it, it seems as if
 
you've see this sight, felt this feeling, had this
 
vision, and have got to find a combination of
 
words that will preserve it by setting it off in
 
other people. The duty is to the original
 
experience. It doesn't feel like self expression,
 
though it may look like it,(47)
 
What myth is for me is described in what Larkin means when
 
he says that the experience of writing "doesn't feel like
 
self expression, though it may look like it." The making of
 
self is like the myth — all surface. It clothes our duty to
 
something deeper. It is the shell that we must deal with,
 
that we must sell to our students so they can experience
 
that ambivalence, the paradox of how the writing changes and
 
how we change with it, and how what we thought was us is now
 
something else. Yet we have a record of it (this self)
 
because we have written it down. And pretty soon, if we
 
continue writing, we understand that it isn't self
 
expression at all, but something deeper, more whole. My
 
thesis is the story of this journey to wholeness within the
 
idea of the writing classroom.
 
Every idea like every story begins at a point of
 
creation, a birth. We come upon a marker and it points us
 
toward a way that gives us an understanding of where we have
 
been and where we are going. Deciding to write about myth
 
showed me my own personal myth of writing and gave me a
 
model for how my students can write and rewrite the myths of
 
their own lives and have faith in themselves as writers. I
 
begin with my personal myth.
 
Personal Mvth
 
James Carse in his Silence of God, a meditation on
 
prayer, describes the essence of faith when he tells about
 
The early Irish monks who would go so far as to
 
put out to sea in small craft, merely to drift
 
wherever the tides and the winds would take them.
 
They considered themselves peregrini, pilgrims or
 
wanderers. They were giving outward form to the
 
spiritual act of placing themselves at God's
 
  
;;:TOercy.'(S:?
 
Carse explains that prayer-filled faith is not "the cry of
 
help" of those using a handy safety net, but those who
 
recognize "that in their human condition they [are] already
 
out to sea"(37). The Irish monks demonstrate how we make our
 
"Greenland" and then live into it.^ In other words, when we
 
make a personal myth, be it Greenland or God's mercy, the
 
implication is that if it is of our own making it allows us
 
to live more fully. However, to live in this self-made myth
 
is to live at risk. The peregrin! throw away the oars and
 
the sail. Yet, we are always "in myth" by our own hands or
 
others. Few of us are aware that this is the case. Fewer
 
know how to make their own myth — not accept the available
 
copies but use these traditional myths to make something
 
unique for themselves. We live our lives combating the
 
forces we sense want to drag us under and feel helpless in
 
their grip. But only when we try to copy do we see the
 
difference between our life and that of others.^ At that
 
moment, we need to be taught to be aware of our ability to
 
make our personal myth, and not to forsake what makes us
 
3 .5 everything. Live the questions howv^^^-, , ;
 
Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it, live
 
along some distant day into the answers." —Rilke
 
* Mary Oliver says concerning imitation: "You would learn
 
very little in this world if you were not allowed to
 
imitate. And to repeat your imitations until some solid
 
grounding in the skill was achieved and the slight but
 
wonderful difference — that made you you and no one else
 
could assert itself"(13).
 
different from others, but see genius "in our hands." We get
 
our first glimpse of our ability to make myth when we are
 
children.
 
I remember my parents had a set of Victorian children's
 
books on the shelf next to the World Book. The book's deep
 
red covers evoked mystery and wonder for me. Inside were
 
glossy illustrations from the Greek myths. There was
 
Perseus, in one picture, astride the winged horse Pegasus,
 
holding the Medusa's head by its snaky curls, a sword
 
dripping by his side.
 
Later in Junior High, Mr. Lambert, my English teacher,
 
had us read Edith Hamilton's The Greek Myths. At the end of
 
the semester we wrote a myth of our own. I wrote a myth that
 
told how sea water became salty.
 
My myth, a tragedy in the best tradition of Greek myths
 
has, so to speak, stood in the place of "seawater" for me
 
ever since. Briefly my story has to do with a young man from
 
a foreign land, a land whose people were the only ones who
 
knew about salt. He steals some "sacred salt" and travels to
 
Greece where he becomes a famous cook. He has a secret. It
 
is this: salt will kill the gods. Zeus and all the other
 
gods eventually hear of this young man because of his
 
delicious food. They invite him to Olympus, which is just
 
what he was hoping for. Well, on the way up over the ocean,
 
beside wing-footed Hermes, his bag of salt starts to rip.
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The salt pours into the air. My young hero loses his balance
 
straining for the vanishing grains and falls to his death.
 
The seas are forever after salty in his memory.
 
In my myth of salt I name a force of nature; it
 
connects me to something ancient. It is a luminous morsel of
 
memory; my own private Edenic experience. I repeat this myth
 
of salt again to tell you about me. With this naming I enter
 
my voice in the ancient chorus — give life to a part of the
 
natural world, my world. Thus one part of the world is no
 
longer strange. It was not that I "explain" anything. In
 
fact, the story stands in for a part of nature and appears
 
enigmatic.^ It was the act of telling that gave what only it
 
could give — "more life"(Carse SG). My knowledge that sea
 
water is salty was the goad for the writing. What happened
 
is that something was created, got into the blood, and now
 
defines me.® I assumed the voice of the salt. And as if it
 
could talk it tells me its story. This was so it would not
 
be silent any longer. The story I had was filled with me by
 
way of the salt."'
 
5 "The Greeks were drawn to enigmas. But what is an
 
enigma? A mysterious formulation, you could say. Yet that
 
wouldn't be enough to define an enigma. The other thing you
 
have to say is that the answer to an enigma is likewise
 
mysterious"(Calasso 343).
 
® This process is circular. I no longer have the written
 
text of my salt myth, but I have repeated it to my friends
 
as an oral tale from memory, and now I have written it done
 
again here.
 
Teaching a Stone to Talk is a title of one of Annie
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In a myth we speak in a voice that is not our own; we
 
tell a story that is not our story; yet we make both these
 
things our own when we collect our thoughts and our voice
 
into the graphophonic symbols of the written word. When
 
these stories appear in this form they preserve a moment of
 
time (my jr. High English class). When I retell my myth of
 
salt it reflects nostalgia and lost power; it has been
 
frozen in that classroom long ago. What does my myth of salt
 
mean now? How do I describe the savor of my life?
 
I am aware that I have for the last three years been
 
constructing the myth of a college composition teacher. I
 
see this teacher I am becoming in the myriad of models of
 
"the teacher" around me. I want to construct a myth of the
 
teacher so that I can see myself teaching. This teacher will
 
be aware as best he can of the necessity for his students to
 
construct their own myth in order to write themselves into
 
the composition classroom as I teach myself into that same
 
classroom. I want to see how and why we should learn to be
 
aware of our myth-making. This inquiry will take up Parts
 
II, III, and IV of this thesis. But first, before I turn to
 
how myth affects writing motivation and pedagogy, I want to
 
talk some more about how myth works in the wider culture.
 
Dillard books. With no irony intended, I believe this should
 
be our pedagogy; to teach stones to talk. We are all like
 
stones that need to be taught to speak.
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Mvth in Culture
 
Myths are integral to how our culture represents
 
itself, especially in literature, music, and the visual and
 
plastic arts. Freud used the Oedipus myth, and Joyce used
 
Homer's Odyssey, retelling the stories in contemporary ways.
 
In culture, our notion of the hero is defined by characters
 
from the myths such as Hercules and Achilles. Modern critics
 
from Northrop Frye {Anatomy) to Roland Barthes ("Myth Today"
 
ABR 93) show how writers use myths to create literary works,
 
help Madison Avenue sell products, allow Hollywood to make
 
movies, and produce pop music icons and their acts in front
 
of worshipful fans.
 
The Greek myths form cultural markers for us, but there
 
is an ambivalence; that is, we both believe and disbelieve
 
the myth. Our need to devalue it serves a covert purpose —
 
so the myth's power can be managed. At the same time it
 
makes them more interesting. It is the duty of the artist to
 
manage the power of myth.
 
Ursula Le Guin in the introduction to her novel Left
 
Hand of Darkness talks about the relationship of the artist
 
and the god:
 
I do not say that artists cannot be seers,
 
inspired: that the awen cannot come upon them, and
 
the god speak through them. Who would be an artist
 
if they did not believe that that happens? if they
 
did not know it happens, because they have felt
 
the god within them use their tongue, their hands?
 
Maybe only once, once in their lives. But once is
 
enough, (iv)
 
13
 
  
Here Le Guin speaks of myth-making as an exceptional
 
experience that seems to be reserved for the few. Yet it
 
starts with recognizing the sacred in all things. The
 
psychiatrist Dysart in Peter Shaffer's play Equus says this
 
kind of recognition starts with worship. He wants to tell
 
that one "unbrisk person":
 
Look! Life is only comprehensible through a
 
thousand local Gods. And not just the old dead
 
ones with names like Zeus — no, but living
 
Geniuses of Place and Person! And not just in
 
Greece but in modern England! Spirits of certain
 
trees, certain curves of brick wall, certain chip
 
shops, if you like, and slate roofs — just as of
 
certain frowns in people and slouches .... Worship
 
as many as you can see — and more,will appear!
 
(62)
 
Part of the problem why we cannot see the gods in our
 
furniture, so to speak, is how they have been trivialized.®
 
Writers like Edith Hamilton, while providing a service by
 
popularizing the Greek myths, rendered them in homogenized
 
form.® As Mircea Eliade says, they have been "dethroned and
 
... brought down to the level of children's stories"(Myth
 
and Reality 112).
 
In contrast, Roberto Calasso in his Marriage of Cadmus
 
and Harmony, tells the Greek myths in their multi-voiced
 
complexity, refusing to censor them for any reason. For
 
® "Furniture" is an unintended travialization of my own.
 
I am sure there are gods in some fruniture. I just can't see
 
worshipping my desk for instance —although I do like it.
 
® We would not know the Greek myths as we do, if it
 
weren't for those like Hamilton who were influenced by
 
Victorian Romantics.
 
14
 
 instance, gone is Eliade's equivocal description of
 
heirogamy as "the genealogy of the Gods as a successive
 
series of procreations"(Mi? 151). Calasso calls it rape. This
 
not only describes the violent act of taking possession of
 
another sexually, but this change in rhetoric (from Hamilton
 
to Calasso) is violent; it tends to strip us of our
 
illusions. It also reflects that as humans we have the god
 
in us but are plunged into the dirt. This is the moment that
 
we realize we are the product of heirogamy. It is the moment
 
the modern appeared. Every age has the modern forced upon it
 
(as does every person). Even Plato was concerned with the
 
impact of the modern.(Havelock) The recognition of the
 
modern is a pivotal point for myth as Red Eric knew. His
 
reaction to the modern was to set himself down "in
 
Greenland."
 
Walter Benjamin, the German-Jewish intellectual of pre-

WW II Europe, speaks of
 
the crisis of modernity [as] a crisis of the
 
secular. Society has been in flight from the
 
sacred ever since its beginnings. Our natures are
 
balanced between the heavens and the dirt of
 
earth, a razor's edge. How we meditate this is
 
through our experience narrated "mouth to
 
mouth."(liiuiwinafcions 87)
 
The "crisis of the secular" is the rift between Romanticism
 
and the Enlightenment, art and science, poetry and rhetoric,
 
the religious and the secular — the struggle between myth
 
and history. Myth in this form is what is cast off by the
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onslaught of history. Myths are the ruins left behind that
 
still speak to us(Benjamin). They speak to us in language,
 
writing in particular, that allows us to deal with the
 
incursion of the sacred into the everyday. This is the story
 
of myth.
 
We are filled with hidden urges and motives for dealing
 
with disturbing experience. When we construct a myth we make
 
it into something that mirrors our struggles with life; in
 
this way it helps us overcome our fear and dread. Myth also
 
reflects how this secularization and fragmentation of our
 
world occurs. Myth models change for us when it is subsumed
 
into the various modern forms of narrative such as the
 
novel, the folk tale, and even the advertisement. These
 
forms represent the democratization Of myth with its power
 
intact but with its genealogy uprooted. The modern forms are
 
veils across the body of the god. We must look below the
 
surface to see the method and practice of myth in our
 
culture as it moves about in its high rhetorical/canonical
 
robes. The technicians of Oz, behind the curtain of culture,
 
are everywhere fiddling with the machinery. Myth is the
 
golden statue that enchants, has the audience's attention
 
while the magician does the conjuring. This pseudo priestly
 
act can be exposed (remembered) when we look at how myth-

making is a tool we can use, as common and as efficient for
 
our lives as the computer I use to write this thesis.
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Becoming aware of the myth we are living becomes the real
 
challenge, it is like understanding a dead language.
 
Parctdox of Mvth
 
It is the paradox of myth that when we talk about
 
it, name it, it ceases to be alive for us; it
 
becomes a "dead lahguage." (Calasso 292)
 
With time, men and gods would develop a common
 
language made up of hierogamy and sacrifice ...
 
when it became a dead language, people started
 
talking about mythology, (Calasso 292)
 
Myth has the paradoxical nature of both being what is
 
true and what is a lie {After Babel Steiner). The stories of
 
the gods make a kind of sense to us, show us ourselves, and
 
at the same time, these stories never "happened." These
 
"axiomatic fictions" (Steiner 144) reassure us and at the
 
same time allow us to pay them no mind. We characterize what
 
we dislike, what we would reject, as myth, in order to make
 
our position clear. In other words we argue a position at
 
pur peril. But myth, what we say about how things work,
 
where they come from, and how they function has everything
 
to do with us. We are myth-making creatures.
 
Myth is the residue of what Still motivates us. The
 
ancient myths were first told to gain power over the thing
 
or person whose origin is told. They originated in ritual
 
incantation where a singer/mage literally brought things to
 
life by way of the words he spoke. These bards sang their
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songs, improvising the received tradition, speaking it in
 
their own "voice."
 
The bard was one of the most powerful persons in pre­
litdrate societies. But t^ role could not survive the
 
invention of writing. Writing allowed the Word (sacred) to
 
be transformed into the word (rhetorical), a shell of its
 
former self, a mask that replacefd the bard's words when it
 
did away with memory. The text then became only a simulacrum
 
of memory, a veil that many took for the real thing. Memory
 
as speech is a living force; as writing it must deny itself
 
to exist as more than an empty shell.
 
It was only when alphabets were introduced that myth-

making became readily available to those who desired to
 
manipulate language to gain (personal/political) power. They
 
disguised the power of myth in the rhetoric of the Good. The
 
blatant power and destruction inherent in the myth, so
 
evident in Homeric Greece, was subsumed into culture and
 
forgotten but not eradicated.
 
Myths are alive in the sense that we "believe" in them.
 
"The gods have never been but they are always"(Sallust)
 
Even though we do not acknowledge their present
 
significance, in the midst of this (and every age's) process
 
of secularization, they still hold sway. It is the nature of
 
the characters in the myth to change, to become something
 
This is the epigraph Calasso chooses for The Marriage
 
of Cadmus and Harmony.
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else. But each change remembers a genealogy. The myth
 
becomes uprooted when the present generation refuses to
 
acknowledge this genealogy. Yet change is inevitable and the
 
myth breaks through.
 
My purpose here is to learn to recognize these moments
 
of break through in our lives and see how writing can make
 
us more aware of when they occur so we can harness this
 
power. On my way to locating the place of myth-making in
 
relation to the teaching of writing, there are three
 
philosophers of myth that I want to talk about: Mircea
 
Eliade, James Carse, and Roberto Calasso. I have quoted from
 
them in this introduction, but now I want to.deal with them
 
more specifically. Eliade gives me a definition of myth and
 
a place to start. Carse takes the position that "myth
 
provides explanation but accepts none of it"(FIG 165). And
 
Calasso describes myth as the "realm of risk" where we are
 
all at play.
 
Myth, Mythographers, and Myth-Makers
 
Definition of Mvth
 
Mircea Eliade gives us a useful definition of myth in
 
his book Myth and Reality:
 
Myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an
 
event that took place in primordial Time, the
 
fabled time of the "beginnings." In other words,
 
myth tells how, through the deeds of a
 
Supernatural Being, a reality came into existence,
 
be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a
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fragment of reality—an island, a species . . .
 
myth, then is always an account of a "creation";
 
it relates how something was produced, began to
 
be. {MR 5-6)
 
This "primordial Time" he speaks of is not historical time,
 
not events plotted on a calendar. In fact, what is most
 
important about this mythic "Time" is that it is circular.
 
The Greek myths are called "cycles." There is a tension in
 
these circular patterns, however, that deposits a weight
 
that must be expelled. The ancient myth rids itself of
 
this tension in violence, and in a new creation, a new
 
myth.^2 An example of this is how matriarchy (The Great
 
Mother) was overthrown by patriarchy.
 
Robert Graves tells us that in the time of matriarchy,
 
in pre-history, when men and women were ruled by the
 
Goddess, the King was killed annually as part of the
 
fertility mechanism of the culture(14). Then somewhere along
 
the line, the King used his power (of incumbency?) to
 
forestall his execution; he put it off indefinitely, while
 
Homer's Greeks wished for the "last instant of clarity"
 
that being killed in the "light" gave. Yet Calasso says
 
"that such vision of life and of the afterlife that
 
mockingly follows" could not be sustained — that the Greeks
 
as a people could not sustain it, so "the heroes wiped one
 
another out beneath the walls of Troy, not just because Zeus
 
wanted to lighten the earth but because they themselves
 
could no longer bear this form of life and thus, with silent
 
assent, chose to seek their deaths together"(Calasso 337).
 
^2 Yeats' center that cannot hold in the gathering,
 
expanding, and ascending gyres: "0 sages standing in God's
 
holy fire/As in the gold mosaic of a wall,/Come from the
 
holy fire, prene in a gyre,/and be the singing-masters of my
 
soul"("Sailing to Bysantium" 17-19, MGBP 515),
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an appropriate sacrifice was found, usually a virgin (male
 
or female).
 
It is probable that this was the beginning of a "divide
 
and conquer" mentality that the powerful (kings) learned to
 
use to maintain their positions. The king's motives are
 
reflected in how the myths were then told, and in the
 
dichotomy between what Eliade terms "true" and "false"
 
stories:
 
In the "true" stories we have to deal with the
 
holy and the supernatural, while the "false" ones
 
on the other hand are the profane content . . .
 
{MR 9).
 
The "true" stories sanctify the origins of society while the
 
"false" deal with more ordinary, earthly elements.
 
In an important footnote Eliade explains what is
 
happening:
 
Of course, what is considered a "true story" in
 
one tribe can become a "false story" in a
 
neighboring tribe. "Demythicization" is a process
 
that is already documented in the archaic stages
 
of culture. What is important is the fact that
 
"primitives" are always aware of the difference
 
between myths ("true stories") and tales or
 
legends ("false stories"). (MR 11)
 
However, what Eliade terms "demythicization" becomes violent
 
and a provocation to iconoclasm if a more powerful tribe
 
seeks to foist its "true story" on a neighboring tribe or
 
group. For instance. Colonialism was such an action
 
perpetrated by the white tribe on black Africa.
 
"Demythicization" is the response of a changing culture.to a
 
specific part of its heritage that is losing power. And, it
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is true that the "people" know the difference between "true"
 
and "false" stories, but they do not always know how the
 
former changes to the latter. This is managed by the
 
shaman's magic when he remembers the genealogy of forces. In
 
the West we have secularized this "magic" into the
 
philosophic notion of dialectic(Hegel). In the play of
 
dialectic we assume that the "true" is good, and the "false"
 
is necessary only in so far as it helps create the ideal. It
 
is noticeable that those who still traffic in the ideal this
 
late in the twentieth century, seem to have lost faith in
 
this process, so that the "false" stories have on the one
 
hand become trivial, mere entertainment, or art, and
 
therefore useless and on the other, they are regarded as
 
tools for propaganda and other mischief.
 
Those in power or wishing to get power see these
 
"false" stories (fictions) as provocations and try to turn
 
them to their own use. They see those who produce these
 
fictions as dangerous, as Plato did and as dictators do.
 
Eliade charts this change as it played itself out in Greek
 
myth in response to the appearance of the "Greek
 
rationalists." He says, buoyed by the new science, they
 
attacked
 
The adventures and arbitrary decisions of the
 
Arendt discribes Benjamin as being a flaneur (a
 
lounger, saunterer, loafer). This describes a method and a
 
personality trait. For the flaneur, a "collected object
 
possesses only an amateur value and no use value
 
whatsoever"(42).
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[Greek] [g]ods, their capricious and unjust
 
behavior, their "immorality." And the main
 
critique was made in the name of an increasingly
 
higher idea of God: a true God could not be
 
unjust, immoral, jealous, vindictive, ignorant,
 
and the like. {MR 148)
 
Here Eliade places himself on the moral high ground (as do
 
the Rationalists) vis-a-vis the archaic Greek myths. Yet he
 
acknowledges the myths recurring significance, decadent
 
though they were. However, there is an agonistic spirit in
 
Eliade's writing about Greek myth. He sees the Greek myths
 
as something to be struggled against. He wants us to
 
understand the Greek myths, and myth in general, in their
 
historical prospective because they alas, will not go away.
 
He notes that "mythical thought ... resists extirpation"(MR
 
176).
 
James Carse would say there is nothing to regret when
 
it comes to the existence of archaic myth or any myth. Myth
 
is only the shell, and more present and absent then most
 
people know. In the last chapter of his Finite and Infinite
 
Games he says, "myth provokes explanation but accepts none
 
of it"(165). According to Carse, Eliade misses the point.
 
Myth is neither true or false, it is a constant, a peculiar
 
kind of constant that is empty until we fill it. The myths
 
allow "the silence that makes original discourse
 
possible"(Carse 165). We cannot live without using them, but
 
we only use the pnes we have decided to fill with ourselves.
 
In this sense myth is an unconscious heuristic that produces
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meaning by being a listening ground; yet, it cannot stand
 
the scrutiny of interpretation. Indeed, this is how myth
 
changes and dies. lnterp|:etation itself is the myth (method
 
— the thing being told iDecomes the telling) of the god who 
rapes. It is the inevital^le outcome of the god who falls in 
love, pursues, and takes possession of the human. This 
process produces metamorphoses that brings on the new 
(myth), and gets rid of ■he old (myth). 
Eliade sees this prpGess of change in the myths of 
archaic people, while he foregrouhds Christianity as the 
logical result of a historical maturation of the sacred. His 
subject is the decadence of myth. Yet while the Christian 
myth, as a tale of "a god who listens by becoming one of us" 
(Carse,FJG 175) may be exemplary; it is not necessary. 
After all, the Greek gods came down to listen too. The story 
of the marriage of Cadmus and Harmony is such an instance, 
and in its day was equally exemplary. 
Eliade's argument valorizes Christianity and 
illustrates the dynamic of myth-making and myth breaking. He 
has forgotten (or has ignored) the genealogy of his own 
Christian myth while he talks with great insight about 
archaic myth and its demise. This paradox is "the very image 
of the Platonic process of learning: nothing is new. 
Carse says, on the last page of Finite and Infinite 
Games, that: "The myth of Jesus is exemplary, but not 
necessary. No myth is necessary. There is no story that must 
be told"(Carse, FIG 176). 
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remembering is all"(Calasso 169). Thus the forgetting of
 
sources forms the inevitable basis of rhetoric and argument,
 
and finds its model in the need to kill the myth that came
 
before.
 
This metaphor of violence shows us the reason why we
 
need to establish new narratives in our lives. Each new
 
narrative is forced to confront an interpretation which
 
produces meaning. However, this meaning is unstable. It does
 
not rest on the act of creation, but the result of this
 
creation, which is a "ruin" (Arendt), a pile of detritus.
 
For instance, in the case of writing, we are forced to fill
 
the void that the word has made with myth. "What follows is
 
a new story," Calasso says, "in which something has been
 
taken away from the density of the body to house the vacuum
 
of the word"(336). The word, as myth, waits for us to enter
 
it and give ourselves in the fullness of the present moment.
 
That moment has a god in it expressed in epiphany.
 
Stages of Mvth
 
The trajectory of myth begins in primitive theology, in
 
the magic inherent in the incantational songs of the bard.
 
For instance, this spell, cast on the world of ancient Greek
 
culture, is replaced by the lilting prosody of the Homeric
 
bard (hexameters), which is in turn displaced by the
 
persuasive and the driving tones of the Rhetor. Each stage
 
does not get rid of the last, but takes the place of what
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goes before and modifies the myth to suit its purpose. If
 
this is true, then something of unaccountable mystery —
 
what Benjamin says he settles for instead of
 
transmissibilityis — is being transported in history. Yet
 
this chrysalis inside the mythic form is new each time. The
 
form is being transmitted, not the pupa of truth — the myth
 
and not its interpretation.
 
The practice of myth-making in culture in general
 
concerns not only what the myth says, but what it does. This
 
distinction rests in the paradox of the word. In the time of
 
the bards, words were known as a force of Nature, the actual
 
breath of the god, which needed to be tamed. The god was too
 
powerful; it could kill you. So society used its power to
 
euphemize to select out these dire myths, to secularize
 
them. Today the power of the myth is still there, only now
 
it is harder to see it. What looks like a dead myth is only
 
the shell, sloughed skin of the snake, the husk of the god
 
who has taken another form. As the angel that presided over
 
the empty tomb on Easter said: "Why search among the dead
 
for one who lives." (Lk.24.5)
 
What is inherent in the earlier acknowledgments of the
 
power of myth in human affairs is the red herring of belief.
 
"Even if truth should appear in our world, it could not
 
lead to wisdom....'Kafka [qtd. Benjamin] was far from being
 
the first to face this situation. Many had accommodated
 
themselves to it, adhering to truth or whatever they
 
regarded as truth at any given time and, with a more or less
 
heavy heart, forgoing its transmissibility'"(Arendt 41).
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The Archetypists, which include Carl Jung and Joseph
 
Campbell, proclaim the unconscious power of the myth, but
 
limit the power of myth to neat proscriptive images that are
 
somehow immutable. To these Archetypists, myths are simply
 
types, each one unique — one among many.
 
On the other hand, since we are concerned here not only
 
with what a myth says, but what it does, then myth is not
 
only ah Objact of reverence and study, but a way of
 
thinking, a state of mind. Socrates before he died expressed
 
it this way: "we enter the mythical when we enter the realm
 
of risk, and myth is the ehchahtment we generate in
 
ourselves at such moments"(Calasso 278). He is saying here
 
that myth can liberate us from the deterministic archetype.
 
That is why, when we sit down to write, we make ourselves by
 
the act of writing (by art), and by the way we link the
 
texts we write about ourselves when we sense the spirit of
 
the word let loose in the flow of our words, linked one to
 
another.
 
Before we sit down to write, mythical thinking shows up
 
most dramatically in something called the "felt sense"(Perl
 
"Understanding Composing"). When we begin to write, it is
 
still there, but eases into the background. The engine of
 
the shift into the background is the paradox of our need to
 
complete the uncompletable text. How does myth get around
 
this difficulty? By telling a story and then by changing it.
 
People in every generation sign on to rewrite the myths of
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the past. We see the vestiges of myth in our own era in what
 
MirGeaElxade calls the "false" stories of popular and folk
 
culture. There are three stages in how myth travels in
 
1. Theology
 
Eliade claims that Homer is not a theologian. We tend
 
to agree with him since we are used to reading Homer as the
 
first epic poet. Eliade says that Homer "laid no claim to
 
presenting the whole body of Greek religion and mythology
 
systematically and exhaustively"(149). Here Eliade himself
 
speaks as a mythographer and systematizer, much like Robert
 
Graves, Joseph Campbell, Robert Ely, Carol Pearson and many
 
others. Eliade and these others are catalogers, and
 
explainers of myths; they express a nostalgia for myths as
 
if they were some lost precious object. On the other hand
 
Homer, Ovid, and Roberto Calasso among others are in the
 
business of retelling the myths as new creations. They don't
 
explain anything; they tell a story, cast a spell. Both the
 
mythographers and myth-makers have their places. However,
 
the mythographer has for too long set the agenda. Their cool
 
cataloguing leaves out the reason myths were made in the
 
first place — to deal with the sacred. Well, the sacred has
 
not gone away. Early myth-makers were first and foremost
 
interested in theology. Our modern day theologians have been
 
marginalized by claiming the primacy of their theology. This
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wasn't the chse for myth-makers who see theology as play
 
Elxade is fight to say that Homer is not a theologian^
 
if he means by this, that he is not a metaiphYsician, iike
 
Plato or St. Paul; but, if he means that he is a poet,
 
soroeone who travels between the spiritual and the prgfane,
 
then Homer is a first rate- theologian.
 
Suoh a theologian sits in the silence of God, (the
 
"fear of God") and brings us words that tell us what the
 
experience is like. Such words to be real come from the
 
'-converted subject." Ve Gregson explains this idea as it
 
is put forward by the Jesuit theologian Bernard Lonergan:
 
The foundation of theology is the converted
 
person's experience .... It is the key ... to
 
explor[ing] the whole range of experience which
 
exists among those who are also converted and
 
whose foundation is, like his own, their religious
 
existence.(Gregson 17).
 
Conversion is the object or state of being possessed. The
 
words of myth buzz around the nest of conversion, the sweet
 
honey of meaning. Homer took the traditional, oral stories,
 
filled with myth, and built his house, his Illiad and
 
James Carse describes a theology of play that "raises
 
theology from a science to an art. This means that theology
 
is no longer a region where we engage each other in dispute,
 
attempting to mark out the boundries for proper belief, but
 
where we come together in creativity and imagination,
 
unwilling to put any boundries around the truth. Theology is
 
inevitable, like spirited conversation between friends who
 
have much to share with each other. It is only when theology
 
is directed at opponents with whom we share nothing, and
 
want to share nothing, that it falsely asserts its
 
primacy"(SG 6).
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Odyssey. His honeycomb^"' was the hexameter.
 
As we have said Eliade charts the journey of myth as it
 
becomes secularized, dumped of sacred meaning, and changed
 
from the "true" to the "false." But this is missing the
 
point. The function of Story is to carry meaning for the
 
"folk" and show them how to live. The culture has control
 
over the voice that speaks in Story. However, at times we
 
are free to reject the message if it no longer has meaning.
 
That is why traditional stories are like artifacts of an age
 
gone by, and it is why the storytelling movement is
 
dominated by folklorist. Yet there is great value in the
 
storyteller's art. It renews the culture. They also define a
 
venue for new stories of modern day "folk." Yet the
 
resurgence of storytelling in the past few years is
 
primarily a conservative movement. They are not told to
 
integrate the older traditions into the modern world, but to
 
preserve a cultural heritage that has been recognized as
 
valuable in itself.
 
The modern retelling of traditional stories mirrors the
 
models that occur in our ethnic folk traditions. Ironically
 
the crux of many folktales is how change is mediated.
 
Metamorphosis is at the heart of story, as Ovid and Kafka
 
show us. For instance, folk-stories start with a problem
 
Walter Benjamin, speaking of Proust says: "From the
 
honeycombs of memory he built a house for the swarms of his
 
thoughts'^{Illuminations 203).
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that has come to the teller's attention in the middle course
 
of a life. Dante's Divine Comedy comes to mind as an
 
extravagant application of this method. Stories always tell
 
us about ourselves somewhere between early adulthood and old
 
age. Many story heroes are young adults starting out in life
 
who must learn a truth and find themselves (their identity).
 
There are many changes along the road to finding oneself in
 
Story—one's own story.
 
2. Story
 
An example of one of these stories is Richard Kennedy's
 
"Porcelain Man." Briefly, this is the story: A young woman
 
is given a broken vase by her peddler father. She puts it
 
back together in the form of a man, who then comes to life
 
and falls in love with her. Her father breaks the vase/man
 
when he finds her with it. Left with the pieces again she
 
decides to put them together once again, but this time in
 
the form of a horse, which then carries her away. When they
 
reach a "circle of trees" the horse breaks itself, so it can
 
return to the form of a man, but the "hero" of this last
 
change, a new character called The Wheelbarrow Man, comes
 
along and sees a set of china in the broken pieces and takes
 
the broken pottery and the girl — now betrothed to him —
 
home and makes plates out of the pieces. However, the love
 
the Porcelain Man has for the woman is transmitted intact,
 
so that at the end, when the plates speak to the woman of
 
love (from the soul of the Porcelain Man), she has to
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"shush" him because reality has fallen on her, and she must
 
be the wife and not the fantasist. Still the plates are
 
there as a talisman of the love that does not die.
 
The story, "The Porcelain Man," shows a way to manage the
 
passions that rage inside us. It tells a very conservative
 
story of our culture. If we look at it in this way (not the
 
only way), it teaches us to repress ourselves and live
 
within boundaries. These boundaries may not always be to our
 
liking. We might not want to choose this way of acting if
 
we really knew we had a choice in the situation. The story
 
is a mask used to instruct us to practices society finds
 
valuable for its own purposes not ours. When the story
 
becomes formalized in this way it becomes a script.
 
3. Script
 
How can we implement an emancipatory pedagogy that
 
does not entail the therapeutic manipulation of
 
its 'subjects.' (Spellmeyer,Common Ground 242)
 
The term "script" or "master script" is defined as an
 
ideology, social pattern, or narrative that is used by one
 
group to overlay their belief system on the other
 
(Spellmever Common Ground). This script predicts and
 
enforces particular behaviors. There is a top down
 
generation and implementation of scripts. It implies a sort
 
of social imperialism, if not social Darwinism.
 
Myth, by the time it has been designated as a myth, has
 
slipped into becoming a script. However, before it is
 
recognized as a myth, it is a narrative that no one is able
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to manage; that is, in the same way a script is managed —
 
derivered to be i^rformed by its dctord. A myth has many
 
scripts and none is"master," because in myth there is tbe
 
imposition of the sacred. In the inyth t^ imposes
 
him/herself on mankind; mankind receives these impositions
 
according to Socrates' "risk" and Carse's pilgrim Irish
 
Monks. The script throws Out the god and introduces the
 
bureaucrat.
 
Myth has always lived in the transmission of the tale
 
of the god. This notion appears in epic song and was
 
mediated by the priest/rhapsode. All others, his audience,
 
were listeners, but as Eric Havelock says in his Preface to
 
Plato, the ancient Greeks participated in the reading of the
 
epic with their bodies. The tale reverberated in them,
 
became a part of them as my myth of salt has become a part
 
of me. They were like tuning forks for it, reverberating the
 
story out into culture and history. There was no doubt that
 
the priest was in control of the ritual machine of the myth.
 
This did not change even in the Middle Ages when the priest,
 
many times the only literate person in the community,
 
controlled the Word and its transmission from God to
 
mankind.
 
The invention of movable type, the Protestant
 
Reformation, and the Enlightenment exploded this control.
 
Individuals were encouraged to seek God's Word on their own.
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The Protestant Reformation gave the folk their own way to
 
God, and their own Bible to guide them, the King James
 
Version. The Bible ais book became arbiter;of the person's
 
life, but then, as they became readers, every other form of
 
knowledge became dissemihated likewise, and there was
 
quickly no difference in kind between the Word and
 
Scientific biscourse. Again the god was expelled. This led
 
to Science becoming master over metaphysics because it was
 
"verifiable." Metaphysics was in a sense "grounded."
 
The point 1 want to make about the script is that it
 
doesn't take into consideration the sacred, the non human,
 
the immortal. To secularize myth-making is to equate it with
 
falsification, mystification. This common modern etymology
 
for myth is a rationalization of the power of whatever is
 
being described, in a pejorative sense, as myth. When we
 
call something a myth (a lie) the speaker of these words is
 
describing the death of the myth; the god has already gone
 
out of it. That is why it is a lie, but we must be careful
 
because what is said next opens a place for the god again,
 
and this will then become the new (myth). It hasn't fully
 
appeared of course, indicated by the parenthesis, but it
 
will. In the meantime, the ( ), like a snake has
 
sloughed its skin and imperceptibly grows it back again.
 
This stage in the myth's movement is the time of
 
mystification, when the (myth) is working in the subject but
 
there is no awareness. This is typically thought to be how
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dialectic works: there is always a practical type of
 
awareness at every step of the dialectic that can be only
 
observed in retrospect. Myth as negation is remembered also,
 
but only at each remembering can the activity of
 
mystification be intuited. It becomes a perspectival
 
maneuver continuously adjusting its focus.
 
This is to say that there are levels of myth-making.
 
Societies perform their myths just as smaller groups and
 
individuals also participate in myth-making. The
 
construction of personae is a direct incidence of personal
 
myth-making. Williams does this with Red Eric. It has the
 
added feature of being, in the hands of some authors like
 
Nietzsche and Freud, intentional activities. There is with
 
these writers a substantial myth produced that establishes a
 
position in intellectual space as they (their physical
 
bodies) could never do. This taking up space is a way of
 
infusing the world with the sacred, a perfection that is
 
never otherwise available. It is a form of appropriation of
 
the sacred, and of the creator's hegemony. A personae does
 
this because it is the fulcrum between the knower (subject)
 
and the known (object), the text in this case.
 
Nehamas gives a striking example of the charms and
 
tricks of perspective in Nietzsche: Life as Literature. He
 
describes a scene from the french film Mon Oncle d'Amerique.
 
In this scene, what first appears to be a country scene, is
 
really a mural on an abandon building. Then the camera
 
starts to focus into show the grass growing out from between
 
the bricks of the wall of the building — the nature scene
 
completly "gone" now in the change of perspective(51).
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The I^ealni of Risk
 
[Wie enter the mythiGal. when we enter the realm of
 
risk, and myth is the enohantment we generate in
 
ourselves at such moments. (Calasso 278)
 
The myth is like an oral filament inside the lighted
 
transcription of a national epic poem like Homer's The
 
Illiad. It is the lively emanation of what later in Plato
 
becomes the script of metaphysics and ideology. We do not
 
write or rewrite the myth as much as we retell it in our own
 
words, improvise it like the rhapshodes who sang The Illiad.
 
It does not change. We are the ones who change because it is
 
embodied, acted out in us. How do we see the piece of
 
writing we have made, when we are focusing on the myth? We
 
remember what it was like in the throes of telling (when we
 
are possessed by) the great story. We end up living only
 
when we remember what we have forgotten — in the midst of
 
telling, in this ecstasy.
 
We can relate to the pleasure found in writing after
 
our work has ended on the text, but while we are in the mode
 
of speaking about what has just happened, we can not tell
 
the truth. We instead establish hierarchies of criticism and
 
argument. How can we stop what we are saying as it leaves
 
our mouths (pens/computers) and use it against the very
 
meaning we want to impose. Use it as a soft weapon against
 
36
 
those that want to force us to say the unsayable and stick
 
to it?
 
The myth lies in the doorway between oral and written
 
culture. When writing became the predominant way of
 
expressing and using knowledge, then the door was closed•
 
Roberto Calasso ends his book as Cadmus and Harmony are
 
leaving Corinth, two fused riders going off "into the
 
sunset" of myth. Cadmus was the one who, responsible for
 
bringing the alphabet to the Greeks, now must leave his
 
chaos strewn land because no one has any use for him.
 
Writing had erased memory and installed a vast silence. The
 
spoken word of the myth with its lively god is replaced by
 
the printed word and its statue (Calasso).
 
Havlock's Plato
 
We must realize that works of genius, [eg. The
 
Tllladl composed within the semi—oral tradition,
 
though a source of magnificent pleasure to the
 
modern reader of ancient Greek, constituted or
 
represented a total state of mind which is not our
 
mind and which was not Plato's mind; and that just
 
as poetry itself, as long as it reigned supreme,
 
constituted the chief obstacle to the achievement
 
of effective prose, so there was a state of mind
 
which we shell conveniently label the 'poetic' or
 
'Homeric' or 'oral' state of mind, which
 
constituted the chief obstacle to scientific
 
rationalism, to the use of analysis, to the
 
classification of experience, to its rearrangement
 
in sequence of cause and effect. [Plato asks men
 
then to] separate themselves from it (the Homeric
 
mind) instead of identifying with it; they
 
themselves should become the "subject" who stands
 
apart from the"object" and reconsiders it and
 
analyses it and evaluates it, instead of just
 
"imitating" it. (Havelock 46)
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Eric Havelock, in his Preface to Plato maintains that
 
there was a sea change in man's thinking between the
 
oral/traditional mind exemplified by Homer and the
 
philosophical/rational mind exemplified by Plato. What
 
really happened is there was a war, similar to the war in
 
Homer, and Plato won (Calasso).
 
When Havelock says that Plato was necessary to the
 
establishment of "scientific rationalism"(Havelock 46), he
 
is always talking in a context. I am not sure that Havelock
 
always knows this because of the value laden terms he uses
 
when he talks about Homer. After all, it was not a mere
 
matter of exchanging books. The Iliad for the Republic, that
 
Plato envisioned, but a complete change in how the society
 
saw itself. This was necessary because what was becoming
 
known (in Fifth Century BE) could not be explained by using
 
the Homeric "encyclopedia." That this struggle between Homer
 
and Plato was over men becoming more self conscious is not
 
in dispute. It is better seen as a struggle around the tools
 
of making that self consciousness more viable and less myth
 
ridden (for Plato).
 
Here we return to the twin presences of myth. One is a
 
shadow, yet supremely viable, practiced, stable, and
 
accepted, but never called Myth; and, two is the Myth, a
 
hollow shell, its former beauty and grandeur in decay, a
 
discredited narrative that has been supplanted, discarded.
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and sent to the dust bins of history. The Greek gods and
 
their cosmology are part of the second sense of myth
 
(beginning with Plato), but always with a difference.
 
Risk Again
 
The risk is that we will miss the clue to the change
 
coming down upon us. Roberto Calasso explains:
 
. . . for every myth told, there is another,
 
unnamable, that is not told, another which beckons
 
from the shadows, surfacing only through
 
allusions, fragments, coincidences, with nobody
 
ever daring to tell all in a single story. And
 
here the "son stronger than his father" is not to
 
be born yet, because he is already present: he is
 
Apollo.(Calasso 93)
 
Will we be crushed or will we weather the change? They seem
 
to be both the same here. It looks like the best thing for
 
us to do — to at least participate in these mysteries (the
 
"fun," i.e. Play) — is for us to choose to act. There are
 
no bleachers to view this show. When Zeus looks around for
 
the son he should fear, he (Apollo) is already there. This
 
is the aristocrat's fear which is never to be undone. It is
 
Red Eric's fear. The guilt of the ruler is palpable; for the
 
god, he prepares a feast of his slaughtered children,
 
(Tantalus and Pelops-Calasso 176). Zeus sends the heroes
 
down to their deaths at Troy to destroy in glory Achilles,
 
who might have been born to replace him. But all along the
 
double (Apollo) is in Zeus's midst. It is not for nothing
 
that Apollo spurs Hector on to destroy Petroclus. Hector
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must die to destroy Achilles; fortune has a god in it.
 
When Priam meets Helen on the Scaean Gate and tells
 
her: "I don't blame you. I hold the gods to blame," (Homer
 
Bk.III, 199) we think he has also been seduced by Helen. We
 
share the outrage of the fifth century Greeks who listened
 
to Gorgias, one of the Sophists, praise Helen in his
 
Encomium. What Gorgias did in his Sncomiuin, however, is far
 
more subtle. It is the matter of truth itself. Homer
 
portrays Helen as blameless, Gorgias takes up the case as an
 
exercise, as play, conscious of the difference between his
 
time and that of Homer's. Things had indeed changed. Self
 
consciousness had gone that one fatal step further, the one
 
writing produced, when it became the "etched model of a
 
silence that speaks" (Calasso 390). Yet, it had not finally
 
been given over to Plato's metaphysics, there was still
 
something being consciously left out, something the oral
 
culture oould value because it was missing or improvised.
 
When writing-culture begins to be slowly developed, speech
 
is backed up into a corner, becomes defensive. It must
 
defend a weakened position. Unlike what writers do when they
 
manage the syntax of their sentences, it must combat the
 
frozen text, and how it has wiped out memory.
 
To squelch this Vestige of the past expressed in The
 
Encomium of HelBn, the '9Te-Socratics had to denounced
 
Gorgias. Helen represented a body that could metamorphosis.
 
Plato et al could not stand for this to happen. Without
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knowledge being seen as material (The Ideas), or something
 
that could be stored up in a kind of storehouse, like a
 
scroll (in a book and then in a library), then what Plato
 
thought was truth would not prevail. Of course, truth was
 
not the Sophists' coin, they preferred to play with words,
 
vjith writing even, to see what it could do.- The trouble with
 
those who play and laugh (Bakhtin,TPI 75) is that they have
 
no cachet in the establishment except as players or actors.
 
A king is a serious person as Falstaff mourns to learn
 
(Henry IV,Prt 2).
 
People praise fools like Falstaff, but live to see them
 
damned. With the new regime in power the fools are banned,
 
as Plato wanted to ban the poets from the Republic. Fools
 
are particularly unarmed. The truth has risen its charming
 
head and these people start being killed for ideas that do
 
not fit anymore. The sophists are ridiculed and their
 
schools lose favor. Plato becomes memorialized, and the
 
Sophists, his prosperous advance men, are forgotten . . . .
 
Yet, the Sophists have not gone away; they are beginning to
 
be remembered again (Gibson). They are being remembered not
 
so much for their lightheartedness, but because of their
 
popularity. Every best selling author is a descendant of the
 
sophists.
 
But best sellers are "innocent" of the myth they
 
propagate. On the other hand, in this thesis I am looking
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for more sustaining motives for our writing and for the
 
writing my students do. In the next section I will follow
 
the string of myth back through the labyrinth of motives we
 
have for writing, to see if it can show us a beginning:
 
somewhere we can write from to see ourselves more clearly.
 
II. Motivation To Write-Takinq A Thread from
 
Harmony's Desire
 
Roberto Calasso in his book The Marriage of Cadmus and
 
Harmony describes how Harmony falls in love with Cadmus, the
 
Phoenician, the man who will bring the alphabet to the
 
Greeks. Harmony's mother, Electra, has promised her to
 
Cadmus, but the girl does not want to marry him and hides in
 
her bedroom. Calasso describes the scene where her friend
 
Peisinoe, who enters Harmony's bedroom in a flutter,
 
proclaims her love for the handsome stranger.
 
Harmony listened and realized that something was
 
changing inside her: she was falling in love with
 
her friend's desire, and at the same time she went
 
on looking around in desperation, because she knew
 
that, if once she left, she would never see this
 
room again.
 
For the first time she felt pricked by a goad
 
that would not leave her be. In her mind she began
 
to say words of farewell. She said good-bye to the
 
caves of Cabiri and the shrill voices of the
 
Corybants, she said good-bye to the palace she had
 
grown up in and the rugged coasts of Samothrace.
 
And all at once she understood what myth is,
 
understood that myth is the precedent behind every
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action, its invisible, ever-present lining. She
 
need not fear the uncertain life opening up before
 
her. Whichever way her wandering husband went, the
 
encircling sash of myth would wrap around the
 
young Harmony. For every step the footprint is
 
already there. (Calasso 383)
 
As in most myths, the story of Harmony and Cadmus' love
 
recalls a common experience and explains its inception. This
 
myth is no different. It explains how desire can be
 
awakened. Harmony is reluctant to love Cadmus, but as soon
 
as she hears that her friend desires him, she falls in love
 
with him herself. Calasso explains that the thing the Greeks
 
say motivates us is "the goad." Harmony experiences this
 
"goad" as an outside force that gets inside, awakens her
 
natural passion for the beloved. This goad makes her, among
 
other things, love this stranger, leave her home, and follow
 
him.
 
At first Harmony's behavior seems to be similar to what
 
happens on any daytime soap opera. But when Calasso aligns
 
it squarely with "what myth is," Harmony's awareness of her
 
own behavior takes on new meaning. Calasso does this by
 
getting into her mind, changing perspective, breaking the
 
spell of his own narrative. He does this so we will reflect
 
upon our own myths of leaving home.
 
A Myth of Writing
 
For me there is something mysterious about why writers
 
write and how they are able to sustain their writing—do the
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work of writing. If I could learn more about this, then I
 
would know how better to motivate my students to write and
 
motivate myself to writei Therefore, I believe it helpful to
 
look at my own history of wanting to write in order to find
 
the thread that links my desire with a sufficient motivation
 
to write.
 
Unlike Harmony's leave taking, when it was time to
 
leave for college, there was no beautiful landscape to
 
leave; yet, there was a state of innocence I did not know I
 
was leaving. I was possessed by a desire to escape a house
 
where I felt silenced. I did not know that I could not
 
really leave. I did not know that I was stepping into the
 
footprint of a myth; unlike Calasso's Harmony, I had no self
 
awareness. I had no Calasso to "read" me. The books I read
 
; had prepared a way/ know how to use them. They
 
were dumb objects. I did not know how to infuse them with
 
When I got to college, I found that my books and my
 
dream of a writing career could not sustain me. I had
 
nothing to say; I was too full of myself. I realized there
 
was nowhere to go, so I dropped out and started to wander. I
 
figured that if I were to become a writer, something had to
 
start happening to me. 1 had to iDedoine fili^ aGtipn,
 
with scene, wit that I did not have a
 
clue how to be a writer. I piled up place, job, and love
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affair, one after another, but found they were as devoid of
 
meaning as the novels I read. They still did not tell me
 
what to write. I found that I was accumulating stories
 
around the blank myth of my family. It was maddening; I was
 
becoming more like them everyday. The myth I had stepped
 
into by my choice to become a writer had been prepared for
 
me, but not in the way I imagined.
 
Walter Benjamin defines the ambivalence of leaving home
 
when he talks about his childhood house in Berlin, he says:
 
"it was prepared for me before I was born"(Arendt 28). It is
 
both reassuring and depressing to know this about the world
 
we are born into. Some would register it as a curse, but I
 
now see it more as fate, in the Greek sense. Bernard Knox in
 
his introduction to Robert Fagles's translation of The
 
Illiad remarks that the Greeks gave us the concept of
 
A Civilization which makes a place in its thought
 
for free will (and therefore individual
 
responsibility) and pattern (and therefore overall
 
meaning), the two concepts—fixed and free—exist
 
uneasily cheek by jowl. (40)
 
The working out of this contradiction is the story of our
 
lives. The paradigm for its telling and retelling is the
 
recounting of the myth, the breaking of it, and how it is
 
reconfigured (Menninghaus). To see how this is managed in a
 
piece of writing I turn to Philip Larkin, who is the poet of
 
these anti-departures.
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Larkin's "Poetry of Departures"
 
In this section I want to deal with Philip Larkin's
 
poem "Poetry of Departures":
 
Sometimes you hear, fifth-hand,
 
As epitaph:
 
He chucked up everything
 
And just cleared off,
 
And always the voice will sound
 
Certain you approve
 
This audacious, purifying.
 
Elemental move.
 
And they are right, I think.
 
We all hate home
 
And having to be there:
 
I detest my room.
 
Its specially-chosen junk.
 
The good books, the good bed.
 
And my life, in perfect order:
 
So to hear it said
 
He walked out on the whole crowd
 
Leaves me flushed and stirred.
 
Like Then she undid her dress
 
Or Take that you bastard;
 
Surely I can, if he did?
 
And that helps me stay
 
Sober and industrious.
 
But I'd go today.
 
Yes, swagger the nut-strewn roads,
 
Crouch in the fo'c'sle
 
Stubbly with goodness, if
 
It weren't so artificial.
 
Such a deliberate step backwards
 
To create an object:
 
Books; china; a life
 
Reprehensibly perfect. (Larkin 85)
 
In "Departures" Larkin recalls the myth of the romantic
 
hero. The poem's narrator characterizes such a hero as one
 
who "chucked up everything/ And just cleared off." Later in
 
the poem the narrator briefly sees himself as such a person.
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who can "... go today/Yes, swagger the nut-strewn
 
roads,/Crouch in the fo'c'sle/stubbly with goodness." This
 
recounts the familiar romantic myth of the wastrel going off
 
to fame and fortune. It is the basis of every Golden Age
 
Hollywood movie. Larkin compares this behavior to what an
 
ordinary man must do, and how such a man is at the mercy of
 
this kind of cant in our culture. Larkin's narrator is
 
someone real in the sense that he is ambivalent. He "hate[s]
 
home" and "Its specially-chosen junk." The narrator, knowing
 
that he is a man who wants to live an integrated life, and
 
live it with honesty, rejects the romantic hero and the
 
clamorous way he is worshipped. The way Larkin breaks the
 
myth is by his use of irony. This irony is thick in the
 
early stanzas of the poem where we see the narrator's tacit
 
acceptance of the hero-worshipping man, his pseudo
 
identification with him. But then he smashes through the
 
myth of the hero in the last stanza:
 
... if
 
It weren't so artificial.
 
Such a deliberate step backwards
 
To create an object:
 
Books; china; a life
 
Reprehensibly perfect.
 
Finally, Larkin with this poem reconfigures the myth of the
 
hero, transposing it into a story of an honest man who
 
rejects the manipulation of culture. The message is that one
 
cannot live someone else's life even if, as Larkin and
 
Benjamin, and especially Kafka, who Benjamin identifies
 
47
 
with, one must at times face the fact that his or her life
 
is god-awful. The making of the poem, the essay, or the
 
story sends a shaft -of light into that darkness.
 
The point Larkin is making is that we cannot really go
 
away. We go through a metamorphosis. For Larkin, heroism is
 
not being sucked into the myth of the romantic hero. This
 
negation is his myth but with a difference. The difference
 
is that Larkin's myth, as is the case with Benjamin and
 
Kafka's myth, is encased in language and a style surfeited
 
with metaphor and irony. Their style has insulated them from
 
being cast into the boneyard of myth where we have cast the
 
romantic hero. In other words, these authors have not had
 
their works reduced by popular culture to empty ciphers, as
 
have the writers of pulp fiction and movies. These popular
 
writers write texts that have already been reduced (see
 
Benjamin's "Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" ,
 
Illuminations 217-251). On the other hand, Kafka's myth is
 
made more enduring because it is both mysterious and
 
evocative—resists interpretation. Myth functions in Kafka,
 
but it is not called myth.
 
The myth that is named refers to the latest ideas the
 
daily newspaper claims are false. Everyday the media touts
 
the exposure of this myth or that. In this sense myths are
 
"not true;" they are lies that have newly been discovered
 
having been the truth just weeks or years previous. Yet
 
48
 
there are those who still believe them, and as directed by
 
the media, we should pity them in the light of what is now
 
presented as new truth. That a myth is not a myth until it
 
is pulled down, however, does not relieve us of the duty to
 
see what if anything of it still remains true. We are
 
reminded that history has a way of repeating itself. History
 
is always present (yet hidden) in the form of the myth; the
 
news anchor's spin on the facts is what we experience as
 
history. We must brush away the posturing of the media, or
 
as Benjamin says: "brush history against the
 
grain"(Illuminations 257) to see the fleeting, truth of myth.
 
My exegesis of Larkin's poem as related to myth does
 
not destroy the poem for those who read it fresh or even for
 
myself as I read and reread it. The man who hates his home
 
is me. I am also the man who is nostalgic for home, as
 
Harmony is, even before she or I leave it. In fact, Larkin
 
amid his cynicism is also nostalgic, or else he would not
 
write about home so incessantly.^® Nostalgia can be a
 
heuristic to pry one's life apart to see all sides of it.
 
This is what Calasso's Harmony does. What nostalgia tends to
 
do if we are not self aware, however, is to settle us into
 
objects that become "reprehensibly perfect," instead of to
 
give us a method to break the myth in order to reconstruct
 
Even his famous indictment: "Families fuck you up"
 
makes us look with a critical eye at family. But there is no
 
way not to have family. He seems to want to break the myth
 
of family and allow for its transfiguring.
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it. Writing has a chance to do this for us. Not only because
 
of the "process" of writing but because it opens a way of
 
life where we are more aware. The key to this new way of
 
life is our continuing sense of ambivalence. I recognize
 
this in how I acted toward wanting to be a writer.
 
Ambivalence
 
There was a time when I was continually falling in love
 
with someone else's desire. However, I was more Peisione
 
than Harmony, more Larkin's man enamored with the hero, then
 
his narrator (Larkin). I never did forget about writing, but
 
I did not let myself get too close to it either, never saw
 
material for it in my "specially-chosen junk"(Larkin 85). I
 
let other things become more important.
 
Because she chose freely, Harmony could fill her life
 
with a husband and children, confident that it was the right
 
thing to do. She could do this only after she agreed to
 
love. However, when I moved in search of my own desire I
 
faltered; I fell into obsession and addiction. To be
 
efficacious, desire must lead without crushing us in the
 
contradiction that "once we have succeeded in acquiring the
 
object of desire, that object is no longer desirable"(Carse,
 
SG 44). We must learn how to receive what we ask for. It
 
must be someone else's desire given to us so we will not
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want it any longer.20 it must be given to us so that we can
 
see it as a husk and know that love was there, has now gone,
 
and needs us to keep following it so we might freely enter
 
it with our love. This love is the core of our remembering,
 
the pure center of risk. Annie Dillard talks about this
 
ever-present sense of risk, quoting Dorothy Dunnett: "There
 
is no reply, in clear terrain, to an archer in cover"(89).
 
How do we stay that extra moment in the clearing; the moment
 
at the center of our need?
 
The Wall
 
This falling in love with someone else's desire is
 
never the end of the story. In the film Shane, the hero
 
played by Alan Ladd rides off into the sunset, leaving
 
behind the widow and the boy. What will their lives be like?
 
Harmony's life did not end with her marriage to Cadmus. That
 
was just the beginning. It did not guarantee happiness
 
either. She gave birth to vicious children (they were
 
murderers and died violent deaths) and a city (Thebes) that
 
exiled her and her husband in their old age. What Harmony's
 
act of falling in love did, however, was to reveal the truth
 
to her—the truth of the myth. It prepared a path for her
 
The character Fax, in Ursula Le Guin's science fiction
 
novel Left Hand of Darkness, explains that the reason they
 
are foretellers (a group that can answer questions about the
 
future) is "to exhibit the perfect uselessness of knowing
 
the answer to the wrong question"(70).
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where she could learn to live as Harmony. I believe that
 
Harmony's story is paradigmatic. It can explain how we deal
 
with needs and the desires that swirl around these needs. An
 
example of this was when I decided I needed a cinder block
 
wall built in my front yard.
 
My hillside yard had been eroding for some time, and so
 
I wanted to contain the soil to be able to landscape it
 
someday. I planned to build the wall myself. I had plenty of
 
time and knew something about construction. While building
 
the wall I expected to learn the skills needed to do a good
 
job. I bought a book to get me started. My neighbor who
 
worked construction and had built block walls promised to
 
come over to give me a hand. In the meantime I got started
 
digging and pouring the foundation. When the blocks were
 
ready to go up my neighbor spent a Saturday helping me lay
 
the first blocks. I watched him and then started a section
 
on ray own. I found that I was a clumsy amateur compared to
 
him. He effortlessly applied the mortar, which was perfectly
 
mixed, to each block placing them correctly with one deft
 
motion. In contrast, when I started building my section, I
 
could not get the mortar to stay on the block. It was either
 
too much or too little, or it fell off when I got it to the
 
row. Everything took three times as long. My blocks were set
 
crookedly and I constantly had to start over.
 
For me this was a familiar learning experience. I
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finally did build my wall. It took observing an expert (my
 
neighbor), reading a book, and finally doing it myself. The
 
irony, however, is that I only got good at wall building
 
near the end of the project, when there were no more walls
 
to build.
 
Need to Write
 
What lessons are there here as I begin to talk about
 
writing practice? One thing I noticed was the effortlessness
 
of my heighbor's wall building abilities. The skill he
 
applied working the blocks is quite mysterious. How does one
 
devote the long hours to learning such a skill? The same
 
question can be asked for those who wish to become writers.
 
There are several interesting aspects of my neighbor's
 
skill at wall building that might help us see how we become
 
dedicated to an art. One thing I observed was that my friend
 
didn't seem to have to think about what he did as he worked.
 
His body was in tune with the job. This is like having
 
memory "in the hands" for a task. Another way to describe
 
the mystery inherent in a craft is to say a skilled
 
craftsmen gets into the rhythm of the work and it "flows."
 
Writers do much the same thing. They work hard at
 
writing for years. They develop a particular form or genre
 
of the writing and a certain "memory in the hands" takes
 
over.
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What is clear in both wall building and writing is we
 
pour something of ourselves into the work that makes it
 
worth doing. Otherwise we would not care to do it. And it is
 
not just a matter of the money. A craftsman usually has left
 
the idea, of the money behind as the principal motivator for
 
the work. The job is worth doing in and of itself. However,
 
there is a limit to what we will attempt. We usually get
 
good at one thing because it satisfies us and takes up our
 
available time. But we have other needs that often go
 
unfulfilled. I take after my father in the way I often start
 
a job and cannot find the energy or the time to finish it.
 
My need to be a writer has always swirled around the
 
need to break out of my family myth. Leaving home was only
 
part of it. Becoming someone other than my businessman
 
father, who was also a painfully silent man, was my goal. I
 
wanted to be creative, be amid artists who, I imagined, took
 
it as their duty to search for a craft/art that they could
 
be uniquely identified by. This was the lure of the creative
 
life for me, and such a life began by rejecting my family.
 
But as my research into myth showed, this was only the first
 
step.
 
I retrieve the idea of breaking apart the myth from
 
Walter Benjamin's difficult and wonderful writings. Since
 
most'of what he wrote is still untranslated I had to depend
 
on commentators like Winfried Menninghaus, who gives a
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mudqlled rendition of Benjamin's theory of myth. Near the end
 
of the article he explains myth in relation to experience,
 
"a self-reflective passage through myth" (323). These
 
passages or rites of passage are where the myth exists to be
 
challenged; on the one hand, as a site of "unrestricted
 
synthesis" and on the other as it "distinguished itself from
 
abstract knowledge through its link to mythical forms of
 
meaning. Experience, then, breaks apart myth by its own
 
means—a dialectical passage de mythe" (Menninghaus 322).
 
Menninghaus finishes by saying "the motif of blasting apart
 
myth becomes transfigured into the dialectic of breaking
 
apart and rescuing myth" (323). Every myth breaks apart and
 
then is reborn out of its own destruction. It is an engine
 
of great destruction and great creativity. Rejecting my
 
family destroyed something but did not replace it with
 
anything. I have since learned that to see myself clearly I
 
must try to reconstruct myself through the eye of my
 
genealogy. I relate this idea to how Benjamin was comforted
 
by the "mausoleum" of his childhood home in Berlin. We do
 
not ever leave that home, but make a life out of our
 
moribund genealogy. The myth is reborn in our genealogy — a
 
sacred site where the work of transformation is done.
 
The metaphor Benjamin uses for this site is the Paris
 
Arcades—the passages, built in the Ninetieth Century,
 
between the street and the shops. The threshold of the
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arcade is the place which is symbolically reduced to the
 
place where we become aware of how the myth is changing, and
 
likewise, how we are also changing. For instance, when I
 
drive into the parking lot at my university, the walk from
 
where I park my car to the door of University Hall is the
 
arcade between my family life and my academic life. Stepping
 
over the threshold into University Hall, I become a
 
different person than who I was in my car.
 
Benjamin's point is that we cross thresholds daily
 
without noticing what is happening. We confront greater and
 
lesser thresholds in our daily walk; most we pass across
 
unaware. We can usually take no advantage of them, but
 
occasionally they are used against us. Benjamin's call is
 
for us to wake up to their importance.
 
The most productive way that I see these passages is to
 
see them as the thresholds of possible worlds. To become
 
aware of these different worlds, we cross a threshold and
 
build a self by our actions within that world. This is the
 
way we construct the various selves we live by. We are
 
transformed in the arcades of our life, taking on a self
 
like pulling on a mask.
 
So if we link the earlier idea, that when we make
 
something we also make ourselves, we can see how writing as
 
a way of making knowledge fits into our work of awareness
 
inside the arcade. In other words, writing as a process of
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working on alternate selves in the middle passage between
 
silence and speech (communication).
 
This riotion of multiple selves 1 take from the theory
 
of consGiousness deyeloped by Daniel Dennett in his book
 
Conscioushess Explained. He rejedts the materialistic,
 
Cartesian idea of the sihgle self for what he calls the
 
"multiple drafts" theoiy of consciousness(101). And if the
 
primary thing that we are conscious of is the self, then we
 
are also forming multiple selves. We tell the same story of
 
ourselves, the one that defines us, but we keep changing it,
 
trying to get it right. The same story is Harmony's myth,
 
"the precedent behind every action, its invisible, ever-

present lining,"(Calasso 383) but with our experience
 
swirling around to fit that "footprint," where the stuff of
 
us is always changing.
 
It must be said that the notion of multiple selves will
 
produce a certain anxiety in some quarters. There is the
 
tendency to hold onto the image of the one self, especially
 
the one that is emerging from any number of cultural,
 
psychological, sexual, racial, or class imprisonments. This
 
is a self that is in need of liberation, a victim in need of
 
redemption. It is also a self that is straining after its
 
authentic, natural voice. These longings are ill considered.
 
To accept a self so bound, is to accept someone else's idea
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of how we should be.^i
 
The unified self has been a site of conflict since the
 
very beginning of Western culture. We are ascribed a self so
 
that we may know our freedom and so we may be controlled. We
 
are told we have this one self so we can continually give it
 
away to obsessions where we experience the phenomenon of
 
never really having self, just the empty desire for it. This
 
is how we are seduced (Carse,5G 51). The seducers are almost
 
always giving us something for the life we are handing over
 
to them. But they never can give it to us completely, or the
 
spell would be broken, the seduction ended, and we would see
 
there was nothing there. The seducer must keep the desire
 
free floating without any affect, so the veil will never be
 
torn.
 
One of the places where the idea of the singular self
 
developed was with Plato. He showed his distrust of multiple
 
selves when he did not want artists in his Republic. He knew
 
they were in the habit of being self-less—or as he said,
 
dealing in mere "reflections of a reflection."
 
In the writer's case, Plato's complaint has to do with
 
creating personae. The usual way of looking at this is that
 
a personae is a mask for the author. The writer creates
 
characters that stand in for him/her. The fictional
 
character is said to be thinly autobiographical. This
 
This is the heart of Freud's idea of transference. See
 
Finke ,("Knowledge" 19) and Freud ("Negation" 54).
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presupposes that there is an autobiography and not just
 
versions of a biography—the subject's version just one of
 
an infinite series. Creating personae is what we do whenever
 
we write with the awareness that we are creating myth.
 
Falling in love with someone else's desire, as Harmony
 
does in Calasso's myth (cited above), is the secret to
 
building personae. We cannot write about what is too close
 
to us, too familiar. We must transport the desire onto a
 
form outside of ourselves. We make it into a (false) story.
 
We do not freely imagine it so much as build it into the
 
myth (as does Harmony) that someone else is living, before
 
they have discarded it, and before they have a chance to
 
know that it is myth. This mythical place is timeless: where
 
art, literature, and story live. It is where we construct
 
our lives. If this is true, how can it motivate us to write?
 
Perhaps we could get closer to an answer if we knew more
 
about why everyday people choose to write.
 
Why We Write
 
A true artist is born with a unique voice and
 
cannot copy; so he has only to copy to prove his
 
originality. —Raymond Radiquet
 
There is a line of distinction in the college writing
 
classroom, and it is drawn by the timed writing proficiency
 
test that determines who will take English 101. This test
 
defines those who are ready for college, and those who are
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not. What we teach by administering such tests is the false
 
value of our own standards; that we value these standafds
 
above students' own nascent desire to write. What makes
 
matters worse is students come to us hobbled by their
 
writing educationf with very little desire to write, and we
 
knock them down again when we test them on their ability to
 
write, a skill they have been taught to have little faith
 
in. And that writing is a skill that has never been
 
adequately presented to students. So what have we been
 
telling students about why they should write? I begin by
 
citing a study by Deborah Brandt ("Remembering"). She
 
discusses early childhood memories of both reading and
 
writing education and learning.
 
Brandt, in her paper compares how forty people, "a
 
broad section of the population"(460) near her college in
 
Wisconsin remember their first experiences with both reading
 
and writing. In her paper Brandt describes how writing is ,
 
viewed in the general, non-academic population. In general,
 
she finds that the group she studied valued reading but did
 
not give the same respect or regard to writing. She links
 
these attitudes to how their parents raised them and how
 
teachers taught them.
 
When Brandt's subjects were children "there was a
 
reverence expressed for books and their value and sometimes
 
[there was] a connection between reading and refinement or
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good breeding"(Brandt 464). On the other hand, Brandt claims
 
writing was more "problematic." For example, parents never
 
wrote for their children and rarely encouraged writing in
 
the home. They typically used writing only for the mundane
 
tasks of accounting and letter writing.
 
One type of writing Brandt's subjects did produce was
 
writing in resistance to others. This writing was in the
 
form of graffiti, class notes, and eschatological
 
scribblings. Diary writing was another typical kind of
 
writing these people did, mainly as a way to purge hurtful
 
or troubling experiences. Much of this writing was ignored
 
or destroyed soon after it was written. In other words, it
 
was not valued even by those who wrote it.
 
For most of these people school writing assignments
 
were "introduced in order to induce, support, or verify
 
reading"(473). This writing was based on professional models
 
which, citing Shirley Brice Heath, "[were] actually a way of
 
imposing elitist values and domesticating amateur, popular
 
forms of writing that had flourished in earlier times"(474).
 
Finally, Brandt says, because writing is so problematic,
 
parents share writing with their children only with
 
difficulty. "Many [parents] are outwardly wary of what they
 
sense are the creative and mysterious origins of
 
writing"(476). This points out the difficulty, Brandt says,
 
of knowing how to use writing in our lives. She notes that
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books, the products of an author's talent and hard work, are
 
seen as valuable, while the act of writing is not.
 
Brandt's study shows that students are ambivalent about
 
the need to learn to write. Typically, when they are forced
 
to write they respond with writing that teachers view in
 
three ways: 1) writing that is minimal, contrary, or off the
 
subject—seen as resistance; 2) writing that is in
 
complete complicity to the assignment ~ duplicates "what
 
the teacher wants;" 3) writing that is unexpected, fresh —
 
like "real" writing. Composition teachers fight students
 
when they resist them, accept their complicity, and
 
recognize with pride the excellent students writing. Many
 
teachers admit, to their credit, that the excellent writing
 
has nothing to do with their instruction. Yet in these ways
 
teachers set up double standards in their classrooms. It may
 
have to do with a sense of angst teachers feel when their
 
curriculum (i.e. control) produces paltry results, and when
 
the work of good student writers puts them, as the
 
Deconstructionist say, "under erasure." However, it isn't my
 
purpose to mourn the low morale of teachers, but to see how
 
writing done in classrooms can be lively and instructive. I
 
believe that to become aware of myth-making practice will
 
give us this kind of classroom. Both students and teachers
 
will be more motivated. I have come to this problem in my
 
graduate studies and by interrogating my own first year
 
practice as a writing teacher. I realize that my writing
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(this thesis) is an attempt to write my myth of this kind of
 
teaching and writing practice.
 
The inability to foster writing, to recognize it as
 
potential, and to not grow resentful when it doesn't appear
 
is a problem for my own teaching. One way to look at it is
 
to talk about the idea that some teachers have, that writing
 
cannot be taught. They believe that writing is a matter of
 
natural ability. When it appears it is wonderful, but it
 
cannot be predicted. It is like the attitude toward creative
 
writing in the Academy. Creative writing is both valued as
 
text and rejected as unsuitable for practice.
 
In Brandt's study creative writing in the home is
 
looked upon with disdain. Those who wrote creatively were
 
ignored or merely let alone to pursue their "gift" as best
 
they could, while the others, in one women's view, need not
 
have bothered:
 
The idea that you must be creative is sort of
 
wrenching it out of the natural. It always seemed
 
to me that it was a natural thing if it was going
 
to come. And the idea of psychologizing it and
 
thinking, now, if a person can express themselves
 
well they'11 have a bigger sense of themselves and
 
this is good for them is nonsense to me, frankly.
 
(C.Krauss, qtd. in Brandt 468)
 
Many believe like this woman that writing is "a natural
 
thing if it [is] going to come." So when clear student
 
writing appears, these people attribute it to this natural
 
ability. This attitude is especially detrimental for our
 
writing instruction, and it is particularly injurious to
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basic writers who arrive in our classroom with a highly
 
developed sense of where they lack the necessary skills to
 
do good writing.
 
When writing teachers want to recognize student
 
writing, encourage and value it, this natural-writing­
ability theory dismisses those students who come to us
 
unprepared to do college writing. These "basic writers" do
 
not get any of the teacher's respect and very little
 
instruction under the rules of natural writing. These
 
students are unprepared to write in the way the teacher has
 
envisioned they should write. The pedagogy resulting from
 
the naturalistic theory usually has nothing to do with
 
students but everything to do with the teacher's own
 
prejudices and predilections. Naturalism is a subtle
 
corrosive element in writing classrooms. I know because I
 
experience its presence in my own teaching.
 
I experience the naturalistic argument as
 
a fact of life as a teacher. I experience it because I
 
unconsciously propagate it, and because the theory arrives
 
with the students (as Brandt shows), as a part of their
 
educational backgrounds. All my theory rejects it. But as I
 
enter a classroom it is there. It is there before I speak or
 
look at a single student paper.
 
Error Correction
 
It is not enough to love the writing as a Composition
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teacher. The question that nags me as I continue to teach
 
writing is how do I love the writing when it comes broken
 
and nonsensical from my basic writing students? There are
 
those who say: I am blaming the student. It is my job to
 
slog through that stuff. What I should do, they say, is work
 
on error with these students. But first detach the error
 
from the student who is making it. But how do you detach the
 
writing product, what is written, from the author and his or
 
her process? Basic writers are nothing if not involved in
 
their own writing. After all, they know they are making the
 
errors. So what message am I giving to the person who errs?
 
That he or she is less.
 
It is true that most Composition theorists I have read
 
on error (Hull, Shaughnessy, Batholomae, Lu) define error
 
somewhat positively, as integral to a person's cognitive
 
processes. For most, it is a way of thinking that is
 
connected mysteriously to the student's personality and
 
culture. Isolating the error, allowing the person to become
 
aware of it, instituting a regimen of practice to correct
 
the error, all has a chance, it is argued, to begin to stamp
 
out writing error. But what if what is torn out is more than
 
just the error? What produces the error might be a valuable
 
way of thinking for that person (Hull). Indeed, it may be a
 
valuable part of the self. What seems to result when error
 
is weeded out of a student's writing is that the writer
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accomplishes, in a sense, syntactic assimilation. The result
 
is the student's voice is either co-opted, or, in this
 
process, an essential voice is duly refined.
 
These two opposing critiques of the perceived need to
 
conform linguistically are given by Batholomae ("Study") and
 
Lu ("Professing"). Bartholomae believes that error
 
correction is necessary because the student must learn to
 
use the discourse of the academic community. He believes
 
students will have to secure their own personal voice
 
elsewhere. Lu, on the other hand, sees a need for the
 
student to retain his or her individual voice and, in this
 
way enliven the mix of styles in academic discourse.
 
My own experience is that students want to learn how to
 
make fewer mistakes in their writing, and they don't know
 
what you are talking about when you say voice. Voice and
 
error are not easily perceived notions for students, except
 
to say, that their failure to pass the entrance exam to 101
 
tells them their writing needs to be cleared of their
 
errors. In other words, these students have not come upon
 
their deficiency in writing on their own, as Brandt explains
 
— they were taught. This is why many of them have a hard
 
time believing they are poor writers. And they may be right.
 
Entrance tests test for certain kinds of writing. Those good
 
at first draft writing have a better chance to succeed in
 
these writing situations. For all its practicality for
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administrators, these tests discourage writing.
 
No one wants to be looked at as being "in error,"
 
despite the error spin-doctors like BarthOlomae and Lu. It
 
doesn't seem to matter that both Bartholomae and Lu are
 
writing in professional journals that do not tolerate any
 
kind of error. These error theorists cannot practice what
 
they preach even if they wanted to. The final irony is that
 
if we purpbsefully single out error, we must eradicate it if
 
it is going to be called error at all. To avoid this irony
 
we should not ignore error, but see how it defines us, how
 
it allows us to "attain to perfection."22 Myth as method
 
helps us see this possibility.
 
Error Redefined
 
In all deference to those who have written extensively
 
on student error I would like to try to redefine the notion
 
of error in a familiar but forgotten way; that is to say, we
 
are all "in error."
 
If we step back into our Western Judeo—Christian
 
heritage, we can see the genealogy of error and an
 
indication of how we might redefine its correction. Jesus,
 
in John's Gospel, 8:7, says: "He who is without sin among
 
There is an element of fear in error correction. For me
 
it is helpful in this context to reflect on a favorite
 
passage from 1 John 4:18: "For fear brings with it the pains
 
of judgement, and anyone who is afraid has not attained to
 
love in its perfection"(New English Bible).
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22 
you, let him cast a stone at her"(ifihg Ja/nes). i cite this
 
dollop of Sunday School wisdom for two reasons. One is to
 
repeat thg secularized and weightless sentiment
 
encased here: we are all guilty of the complaints we make
 
against others. This idea has become "light" (Kundera). Its
 
moorings have been cut from John's Gospel, and it does not
 
do anymore what it was meant to do. I want to put it back
 
but for a new context — the writing classroom. Show how
 
writing makes a space where we can listen to each other and
 
build a life, perhaps even a writer's life. This writer's
 
life has a genealogy for each of us. The myth that we have
 
been given to see ourselves as a writer must be exploded. We
 
are always in metamorphosis. There is always fear and risk
 
in this as Calasso says, but also more life.
 
The second reason I picked this scene in John (8:1-11)
 
is because it is the only place in the gospels where Jesus
 
wtiteS' provided me with the "chink" to coax out my own
 
writer-based interpretation of Jesus' actions.
 
In this story from John's Gospel the adulteress, caught
 
in the act, is brought to Jesus. The law says she must be
 
stoned. "What does Jesus say" asks the Pharisees. Jesus
 
knows that whatever he says he will be found wrong. Instead
 
of falling into their trap he "stoops down, and with his
 
finger [and writes] on the ground, as though he heard them
 
not"(v.6).
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I have never known what to make of this verse. The text
 
does not say what he writes. Some say it is an accounting of
 
the sins of those who accuse the woman. This seems unlikely
 
because few if any could have read what it was Jesus wrote.
 
Anyway, the sin he is talking about in v.8:7 is Sin in
 
general, not specific sins.
 
So why did they all leave? I think it was the specter
 
of the holy man writing in the dust that spooked them, made
 
them listen to his words and caused them to be convicted.
 
Not only that, what persuaded them to leave was the writing
 
itself — not what was written.
 
The way Jesus got out of their trap was by proposing to
 
them that they throw the stones, while making it impossible
 
for them to act. This was clever enough, but enclosing this
 
command within the action of writing (he stoops down twice
 
to write) he shows us that it isn't the words that are
 
important, but the act. The irony is especially pungent
 
because he writes in the dirt.. His act of writing has done
 
something else too. It shows the woman her sin. Not by
 
pointing it out to her, but by pointing out how it isn't
 
being pointed out. When Jesus gets up after all the woman's
 
accusers have disappeared, our author included, the sin (of
 
adultery) has been written away. We imagine the wind and
 
traffic on the road will shortly obliterate any trace of it.
 
Also, and this is my point, the silence of Jesus' writing
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allowed the creation of something new in the women,
 
something that even she does not know the nature of. I am
 
convinced that the act of writing is at the heart of the
 
mystery; it produces the new life that is offered to the
 
woman. Whether she accepts it or not is speculation and of
 
no matter. What is clear is that the silent writing of Jesus
 
gave her that new self. This self is not a thing complete by
 
any means. It is something that needs to be filled, in her
 
case, by a life lived in imitation of Jesus' life. This is
 
John's purpose in writing this story.
 
I take another purpose from this story. It forms itself
 
into questions I am only beginning to ask of my own teaching
 
practice: Is it possible to provide a writing silence for
 
our students so they may have new selves to fill with
 
whatever they desire? And can we ask, while they are with
 
us, that they use their writing to fill this silence? I
 
think we can when we become aware of the myths we enter the
 
classroom with, and the possibilities of making ourselves,
 
not as Plato wished —- less myth ridden — but more myth
 
conscious, thus multi-voiced.
 
Ill. Motivation in the Writing Classroom
 
Nemesis
 
Our culture is so much an amalgamation of the Judeo-

Christian and Greek traditions that we do not know where the
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one begins and the other ends. From a distance it looks like
 
there is a layering of hope (Judeo-Christian belief)
 
splashed over a dire Greek mythos. It has been only in the
 
last two hundred years that this pastiche, orchestrated
 
primarily by St. Paul and Augustine, has started to crumble
 
under the weight of its own practices.
 
That Greek thought was subsumed into the Judeo-

Christian ethos does not say that it was in any way quieted.
 
It does not take a seer to see that Western society is in
 
many ways Christian in name Only. We prod1aim as Americans:
 
"In God We Trust," but since most of the founders of the
 
Republic were Deists, the sarcastic retort pasted on the
 
auto mechanic's wall: "all others pay cash" rings true with
 
a bitter laugh.
 
We have had to pay. The coming of the Messiah and the
 
Last Judgment are put off. We are concerned with death; it
 
is in our bones. We pursue and are pursued. Big fish eat the
 
little fish, who in turn are eaten by even bigger fish. The
 
eating and the guilt is endless. The guilt especially
 
because from the time we were small we become aware of
 
ourselves as beings that consume other beings.^3
 
There is a faceless despair hiding behind all of this
 
"The primordial crime is the action that makes
 
something in existence disappear: the act of eating. Guilt
 
is thus obligatory and inextinguishable. And, given that men
 
cannot survive without eating, guilt is woven into their
 
physiology and forever renews itself"(Calasso 311).
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that culture has tried to hide. The Greeks had a name for
 
it, she was Ananke. How it was embodied was in the form of
 
the daughter, Nemesis (necessity). The myth of Nemesis is a
 
story of being pursued and at the same time an act of
 
possession. Calasso describes the myth of her seduction by
 
Zeus:
 
Nemesis fled to the ends of the earth to escape
 
Zeus, transforming herself into one animal after
 
another, just as the manifest flees and scatters
 
before being caught and pinned down by its
 
principle. The same sequence of flight with
 
metamorphosis followed by rape is repeated when
 
Peleus chases Thetis and finally couples with her
 
in the form of a cuttle fish. The repetition of a
 
mythical event, with its play of variations, tells
 
us that something remote is beckoning to us. There
 
is no such thing as the isolated word,. Myth, like
 
language, gives all of itself to each of its
 
fragments. When a myth brings into play repetition
 
and variants, the skeleton of the system emerges
 
for a while, the latent order covered in seaweed.
 
(Calasso,136)
 
The basic repetition Calasso describes is a harsh indictment
 
of our state as human beings. Many would deny it. But in so
 
doing we leave ourselves open for not understanding how we
 
have always been able to ameliorate the consequences of
 
"flight/metamorphosis and rape." Our making of myth has
 
allowed us to do this. And to reduce it further, as Calasso
 
begins to do, when he equates myth with language—a tool—
 
and therefore, a myth making tool also. It allows us to
 
flee, to metamorphose, and to understand the inevitable rape
 
(rape in the sense of possessing and being possessed). For
 
it is not what we have that motivates us, but what we will
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become. To appreciate this idea we must become conscious of
 
how and why we must flee and change. Learning then can
 
become the reason that motivates us.
 
Brophy; Motivation to Learn
 
Educational psychologist, Jere Brophy, defines
 
motivation this way:
 
Student motivation to learn is an acquired
 
competence developed through general experience
 
but stimulated most directly through modeling,
 
communication of expectations, and direct
 
instruction or socialization by significant
 
guides, those others, especially parents and
 
teachers, who are more experienced. If activated
 
in particular learning situations, motivation to
 
learn functions as a scheme or script that
 
includes not only affective elements but also
 
cognitive elements such as goals and associated
 
strategies for accomplishing the intended
 
learning. (Brophy 40)
 
Brophy's script, along with most such scripts, gain its
 
power from being integrated into the economy of the self
 
where they are only recovered after the fact. There is no
 
choice in the implantation. Our cultural baggage is given to
 
us at our birth, "our mausoleum" (Arendt 28). The knowledge
 
of how scripts work arrives gift wrapped for administrators
 
and politicians, prison wardens, and those who run mental
 
hospitals — all who wish to devise procedure and set public
 
policy (Foucault). These scripts feel permanent and
 
irrevocable. However, they deny the process which gave them
 
life. They became scripts in the free commerce that produces
 
every act of creation. In this case, the student acting
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within the learning situation'acts with the teacher to
 
create a place to learn.
 
Yet these motivational scripts are only practiced as
 
scripts when they are not useful. They are useful to
 
someone, but not eminently so. The creating of the scripts
 
is the important part of motivating students and not the
 
practice of writing to scripts. If we present our students
 
with the scripts, or genres in the composition classroom, we
 
present them with the abandon molds, objects where the
 
"god has gone out of"(Calassso). In this way the scripts are
 
what we are left to deal with; and they are adequate. The
 
god has not gone far because there are always new scripts to
 
embody. Every form is a hollow place to put the self; the
 
god has prepared the form for us. It is the myth.
 
I do not wish to argue against the scripts but against
 
valorizing any particular script, genre, or form in the
 
composition classroom. I want to argue for the awareness
 
that any particular script, as James Carse says about myth,
 
"is exemplary, but,not necessary"(FJG 176).
 
"...in the molds for fragments of the drapery of
 
Phidias's Zeus [the statue] found in the sculptor's studio
 
in Olympia: the material is neutral and the same throughout,
 
only the curves of the folds very. In the end it is what is
 
cast that survives. We live in a warehouse of casts that
 
have lost their molds. In the beginning was the
 
mold"(Calasso 175).
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Lack of Content
 
The writing classroom is unique for its lack of
 
content, or fixed curriculum. I see this as a benefit for
 
the teacher of Composition. However, it presents great
 
possibility and danger. Like myth, it represents a "realm of
 
risk." In Composition Studies we do not have a layered
 
history of cause and effect, one fact or idea building on
 
another to form a grand pyramid of knowledge and
 
significance. Our students must contend with themselves:
 
writers plunked down in front of the ubiquitous blank page.
 
We ask, what shall they write? I say, let,them write
 
themselves. Let them construct the myth of themselves as
 
writers in the college classroom. I want them to accept what
 
it means to be a college writer. But there is a genealogy
 
here that we cannot forget. The classroom, like Benjamin's
 
mausoleum of childhood, holds a myth for both teacher and
 
student that is powerful and daunting. It is never easy
 
starting a new writing course.
 
I am afraid that most Composition teachers, myself
 
included, start the term with a certain dread. We haul out
 
our choice of readers, rhetorics, and writing assignments
 
and hope for the best. When the drama of the classroom
 
begins we institute the writing, the instruction, and
 
evaluating processes. The teacher and students assume roles
 
around a script presented by the teacher, the university.
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and in a more general way, the culture. And to give our
 
writing classrooms legitimacy we try to understand our
 
changing culture and how we are a part of it and not
 
enforcers (colonialist) of the hegemony of one culture over
 
another. We do a pretty good job of this. But somehow there
 
is no joy in Muddville. In most cases we teachers are still
 
students ourselves. We are chagrined by our behavior in
 
front of the classroom. We must tell others what they should
 
write and how they should write it.
 
One of our problems is choosing a text to use as a
 
writing guide. I wish to frame the particular choice of a
 
text in the context of what I have said so far, and that is,
 
the problem reading a text is a problem of reading "in
 
myth." I believe that each person must do this for him or
 
herself. We are the embodiment of myth and travel through
 
culture and classrooms, for instance, collecting pieces of
 
this culture for our own use.
 
Our ability to read our culture, therefore, goes beyond
 
the ability to read selected texts. It is more a problem in
 
translation. Thoreau in tfalden, referring to the ancient
 
classical texts such as The Illiad, says "that no transcript
 
of them has ever been made into any modern tongue, unless
 
our civilization itself may be regarded as such a
 
transcript." (III. 6) Not only is the writing about us but
 
it makes us, makes "civilization, as we know and pursue it."
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(Steiner 487) If this is true then when we write we not only
 
write about the culture but we have a hand in producing ;
 
culture. Thoreau is talking about a doubling effect, a
 
translation that is carried out repeatedly. The translation
 
can be seen as a metaphor for all writing.
 
We read a text and we make it our own; we read it to
 
possess it, while it also possesses us. The lowliest writing
 
about text is then a making of text (self) in the shadow of
 
that multifarious cultural text that we are a part of
 
and that we have a part in forming.
 
But how then to we choose a pedagogy and choose
 
correctly in order to serve our students needs as writer?
 
The neat answer that comes to mind is that there is no right
 
text. Students are concerned with writing error free papers
 
and fulfilling a requirement, and we are in the business to
 
help them do these things. The well chosen text is not
 
enough in most cases to help us help our students. We must
 
learn to teach the text.
 
It is not that whatever we do is all right with them.
 
Or that they will learn to write because or in spite of us.
 
But by looking at myth-making as method we as individuals
 
can learn to choose what kind of writing pedagogy is right
 
for us. This entails giving students responsibility for
 
their own learning and for constructing a multitude of
 
voices in their writing.
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It is instructive to see how different theorists in
 
Composition deal with voice. The Social Constructivists
 
require the student to develop an "academic" voice, while at
 
the other end of the spectrum the Expressivists want the
 
student's "authentic" voice to come to the fore. My position
 
is that we need both of these notions of voice (and more),
 
but neither goes far enough in an attempt to make what Kurt
 
Spellmeyer refers to as "common ground." I am reminded of
 
what James Garse says about the failing of theology: "it is
 
only when theology is directed at opponents with whom we
 
Share nothing, and want to share nothing, that it falsely
 
asserts its primacy"(JJ 6). What I am trying to say is that
 
we often silence each other with our arguments for what we
 
consider to be our students' greater good. I am afraid our
 
students look at us and say: "How do you know? You haven't
 
asked us." Listening, myth-making, and creating a writing
 
self (and a teaching self) all go together. The tendency to
 
become a disciple of one or the other of the Composition
 
camps I mentioned above is overwhelming at times. But it
 
should not blind us to the value there is in each of them.
 
In fact, their claims provide us with the current myth of
 
Composition. But let us see how their struggle over student
 
voice in particular, is a struggle within all of us for a
 
better knowledge of our own writing voice(s).
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Expressivist and Social Constructivist
 
The two principal schools of thought on how student
 
voice is to be viewed in the writing classroom are first,
 
the Expressivists, who loosely follow Peter Elbow; and
 
second, the Social Constructivists, led by David Bartholomae
 
and others.
 
Expressivists believe that self knowledge precedes any
 
functional discursive knowledge. A personal voice has to be
 
recognized before a public voice is used. Individuals begin
 
to know how to write by getting the writing out, by
 
freewriting and participating in "believing games"(Elbow,
 
Power 270). This is criticized by the Social
 
Constructivists, on the other hand, for promoting isolation
 
and narcissism. The Expressivists counter that they are
 
"blending rather than separating the personal [voice] and
 
the public [voice]"(Fishman 653). Others are not so
 
sure.(see responses, especially Farmer 548, College English
 
9/93)
 
Both the Expressivists and the Social Constructivists
 
speak specifically in terms of voice. For the Expressivist,
 
"voice" is more personal, something singular and material.
 
The Social Constructivist's "voice" is no less material, but
 
socially produced, an academic discourse. Elbow in his book
 
Writing With Power gives examples of voice but cannot
 
describe how it is produced. The Constructivists talk in
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terms of effective communicatith, audience, and claritY, all
 
to produce a particular kind of student "voice—an original
 
and authentic voice which will allow them to fluently and
 
expressively speak the language of the university"(Pfeiffer,
 
e® 6§9). But it is not clear how writing can be abstracted
 
to accommodate all tbe diffefeht kinds ofracademic voices 
'there;are ■Out.;there." , .i ; ■ ■ 
These two approaches deal with two separate and 
specific areas of student life. The Expressivists purport to 
help students with their personal lives, promoting a self-
help goal of writing. On the other hand, the Social 
Constructivists' goal for student writing is their struggle 
to find a career path. 
I value both these views on voice. However, it has been 
hard in my graduate studies not to take a side and champion 
one view over the other. Ibelieve I have lost something of 
the "body" of Composition studies when I have tried to do 
so. This need to take a side is an entrenched part of our 
culture, and I am not arguing against it. So how do we value 
both, and act against this need to take a position? The most 
we can do is make an attempt to write ourselves out of the 
current myth and into a new myth within our own culture. It 
is never entirely successful. Kurt Spellmeyer makes this 
attempt in his writings on Composition. He does not totally 
succeed but it is instructive to watch how he is trying to 
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create common ground in Composition Studies. He begins by
 
arguing with his opponents in Composition Studies,
 
Spellmeyer
 
Kurt Spellmeyer in his book Common Ground: Dialogue,
 
Understanding, and the Teaching of Composition describes the
 
academy as a place where teachers/scholars have ferreted
 
away the ideas of culture for their own use. They jealously
 
guard high culture and dole it out in ways that can only be
 
seen as self serving. Students are serfs of these great
 
landowner/teachers. Students serve them until they
 
themselves can carve out little plots, little fiefdoms to
 
rule. He says as teachers we stamp out students in our own
 
mold; they learn to write as we write.
 
Spellmeyer preaches against this traditional top down
 
paternalistic classroom throughout his book Common Ground
 
and his essays in College English. He believes that we must
 
establish a common ground with our students to allow them to
 
write authentically and for the writing to be important to
 
them. He has some definite models for the kind of teacher
 
who strives to create this common ground, and who he will
 
allow to use it with him.
 
In his essay "Language, Politics, and Embodiment"
 
Spellmeyer says the anthropologist James Mooney's "writings
 
offer us a deep-political alternative to the reductive
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heuristics of 'argument' . . (279). Mooney- is one of
 
Spellmeyer's heroes. He lived with and wrote about native
 
Americans during the days of the Great Ghost Dance in the
 
1880s. For Spellmeyer, Mooney is the exemplary
 
scholar/researcher because he observed the Plains Indians
 
"non-invasively," establishing with them, amid the mysteries
 
of their practices and beliefs, a "common human ground—
 
common not in the details of what [they] thought, but in the
 
dilemmas that made thought necessary"("LPE" 278). He is one
 
of Clifford Gertz' "'implicated' anthropologists, who 'don't
 
study villages' but 'study in villages': not impersonael
 
recorders, but parties to an unpredictable, mutually
 
transforming dialogue" (Spellmeyer,"Foucault" 722).
 
Spellmeyer uses Mooney's life and work as an example by
 
analogy of how composition teachers should act with their
 
students by not being afraid to let student writing be the
 
plane of conversion between them.
 
I have come to value Spellmeyer and his characters
 
(Mooney, Foucault, and Hanson in "Travels") as real
 
\exemplars of ways to operate that are valuing and are
 
responsible to the differences of people. Spellmeyer's
 
concern — he publishes in College English and is a director
 
of a writing program at a prestigious university — seems to
 
be with student writers. However, what strikes me in all his
 
writing is the position he has taken as theorist and
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teacher, using an anthropologist and ethnographer as an
 
example for teachers ahd Students, while at the same time
 
writing the kind of prose he is attacking. There is a
 
paradox here that he acknowledges only once, as far as I
 
know, in his own writing, and then it is effaced. It makes
 
me question his desire for common ground. Perhaps he is
 
preparing ground only for those who believe the way he does.
 
In the last paragraph of Spellmeyer's essay "Foucault
 
and the Freshman Writer; Considering the Self in Discourse"
 
he quotes an "anonymous reader" who read his essay before it
 
was published in College English. He calls him "a reader
 
that has shown me an outside where I had least expected it."
 
This person comments that:
 
One student's essay is hyperbolically praised as a
 
model of success, while the other student's essay
 
is dismissed as a failure....I would suggest that
 
the writer is adopting here, in relation to a new
 
norm of "good student writing," something of the
 
authoritarian pedagogic stance which he began the
 
essay deploring. ("Foucault" 729)
 
Spellmeyer ends the article being grateful for this
 
"outside" (person), a term he takes from Foucault, that
 
defines a place and a person speaking in the natural
 
dialectic between self and other. He says it has "restored
 
the problematic" and "opened a new outside to me, to my
 
students, and to the colleagues with which I work most
 
closely." Or has it? Three years later he included this
 
article as a chapter in Common Ground, but he drops this
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concluding, ameliorative paragraph completely and adds in
 
its place more discussion of Poucault's theories.
 
It is quite common for the authors of articles in
 
College JSngiish to discuss their particular pedagogical
 
theorY and then, in the second part of their article, give
 
some examples from student writers. It is also common to
 
cite both "good writers" and "bad writers." Spellmeyer's bad
 
writer is a "basic writer" who is trying to "go native"
 
(722) (suppress her own voice in lieu of acquiring an
 
academic one). This basic writer's "crime" is to blend two
 
disparate points of view and say what she thought without
 
first making it clear what the disputed issues are.
 
Spellmeyer's "good writer" does this more expertly. The
 
point is that experience builds knowledge, and the "good
 
writer" is able to bring her own life and ideas into
 
convergence with her subject, while the other writer merely
 
blindly imitates what the tsa-chei' wants.
 
This "good writer" in Spellmeyer's essay on Foucault
 
can be aligned with other Spellmeyer's heroes, James Mooney
 
and the latest. Earl Parker Hanson, an ethnographer in the
 
Amazon Basin circa 1930. Hanson appears in "Travels to the
 
Heart of the Forest: Dilettantes, Professionals, and
 
Knowledge." I don't mean to disparage Spellmeyer's models or
 
his writing about them. They and it is wonderful. He tells
 
their stories with the passion of an ideologue. And that is
 
the trouble.
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In all his writing he vies against the ideologues; he
 
argues his case against theirs. He plays at "the reductive
 
heuristics of 'argument'" himself. He takes Foucault as his
 
true master but does not follow him. He quotes him in a note
 
in Common Ground:
 
We must conceive of discourse as a series of
 
discontinuous segments whose tactical function is
 
neither uniform nor stable....[We] must not
 
imagine a world of discourse divided between
 
accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or
 
between the dominant discourse and the dominated
 
one; but a multiplicity of discursive elements
 
that can come into play in various strategies(93).
 
This sounds amoral and perplexing at first, especially since
 
Spellmeyer has been pitting different discourses against
 
each other, but what Foucault means, I think, is that we can
 
play this language game and not be played by it. We play the
 
game but are aware of it as a game.^^ Spellmeyer
 
acknowledges this in his term "embodiment," but he doesn't
 
seem to practice it. Foucault's life and death embodied his
 
theories. He always put himself at risk for his ideas. As
 
his ideas changed, his life changed (see Miller's The
 
Passion of Michel Foucault).
 
But finally, what I value about Spellmeyer's writing is
 
the chance to see how the myth of Composition studies is
 
worked out by him and how it works on him. His faux pas in
 
arguing against a method that he uses is not interesting to
 
This is James Carse idea that we play at a series of
 
finite games within an ongoing infinite game.
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me for how it "exposes" him. It is interesting because in
 
his attempt to deal with the Composition animal from within
 
its bowels he fails to break out of the myth. This
 
illustrates how the myth-maker (Spellmeyer) is unable to see
 
the further labyinth beyond the one he currently sees
 
himself breaking out of.
 
Spellmeyer is employing Eliade's "true story"/"false
 
story" dichotomy here. Just as Eliade cannot see
 
Christianity as a myth, Spellmeyer cannot see that what he
 
is doing makes just another myth for Composition. His may be
 
exemplary but it is not necessary (Carse).
 
However, I can relate to Spellmeyer's conundrum. It is
 
especially instructive, for instance, in explaining the
 
queasy feeling we get as teachers when all our best laid
 
lesson plans go up in flames at the simple student question:
 
"I don't understand." We present our lesson the best we can,
 
and when it is not understandable, then we have to stop and
 
find out why. Perhaps even admit that we were wrong.
 
Spellmeyer seems to be ignoring this feeling while he
 
presses his own myth of the Gertzian "implicated"
 
Composition theorist. He does not practice Compostion as an
 
art as James Carse encourages theologians to practice
 
theology. He does not seem to want to share anything with
 
those he criticizes.
 
Kafka wrote a parable with this theme called "An
 
Imperial Message."
 
86
 
26 
For me Spellmeyer is a Moses figure. He has brought me
 
to the promise land, to a better awareness of how I need to
 
be aware of my students needs and not impose my myth oh
 
them. But Spellmeyer cannot lead me to see how to change
 
this about my own teaching practice. He merely shows me the
 
need to be "implicated" and not how to be that new person.
 
Derek Owens on the other hand takes a more radical but
 
Still a traditionalist tack toward Composition. He seems to
 
be a bit more aware of himself and the nature of his
 
arguments and their efficacy than Spellmeyer, but in the end
 
he is no less flawed.
 
Owens
 
Derek Owens in his book Resisting Writings is much like
 
Spellmeyer in his dissatisfaction with both the
 
Expressivists and the Social Constructivists. Where
 
Spellmeyer writes about the explorers of the margins, those
 
in the outback of discourse, Owens pushes for alternate
 
forms of writing, what he calls "resisting writings." One of
 
the real differences between fhe two, however, is that
 
Owens, throughout his book, admits the absurdity of writing
 
against the establishment and publishing such writing. In
 
other words, writing conventional discursive prose about why
 
you think traditional discursive prose is garbage. This is
 
an irony he seems to enjoy in Resisting Wrtitings. Those
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expecting a consistent argument will probably stop reading
 
at his confession that he is spilling out what is for him
 
mother's milk. Yet, I admit that he seduced me with his talk
 
of resisting the staid writing in Composition. I wanted to
 
know what this "young turk" had to say about the changing
 
rhetorics of Composition even if his writing is not an
 
example of these changes. Yet, while naming the seduction
 
(read myth) we step out of it.
 
Owens' argument against academic prose is a wonderfully
 
layered piece of work. He quotes Adrienne Rich, who is
 
quoting Walter Ong, who describes argument as a male
 
centered rhetoric originated in ''Learned^
 
medieval academy. Ong says that it was prominent "until the
 
romantic age." Owens counters that it is alive and well in
 
the modern academy and is even what he does in his own text,
 
quoting Olivia Frey:
 
[Her] findings imply that the rhetorical combat
 
described by Ong has continued to thrive long
 
beyond the romantic period, remaining a standard
 
for the public language of our profession
 
(elements of which, readers will notice, are alive
 
and well in my manuscript too). 'What troubles me
 
the most,' she writes, 'is the basic, unexamined
 
assumption that the best way to know things about
 
literature and to help others know things about
 
literature is by presenting a thesis and making a
 
case for it by answering conterarguments. . . .
 
The implication [is] that if one does not argue
 
well or argue at all, the writing is unclear,
 
ineffective, and unconvincing'"(Owens 115).
 
But this does not mean that Frey has been able to write
 
without arguing her case in her own essay.,As Owens notes.
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 she "feels professionally obligated to avoid any attempt to
 
discover her own version of exploratory rhetoric. 'I hope I
 
have the courage, 'she concludes, 'to write differently next
 
time'(524). Me too—" chimes in Owens. Well, this part of
 
the whole charade do^s not impress me. I am led to read the
 
resisting writers he names in his book for what news there
 
is from the boundries. But Owens is like Ariadne — better
 
left on Nexos while we go off back to the real work on
 
Greece.
 
: Both Spellmeyer and Owens are fine writers and have
 
powerful friends in scholarly magazines and publishing who
 
are themselves, we assume, concerned with the moribund
 
nature of Composition. However, these writers, editors, and
 
publishers are not about to print some of the wild examples
 
of "essays" (see Owens section "Essaying Alternatives" 28)
 
that Owens talks about because ... well, it isn't done. And
 
that is the trouble. Spellmeyer says he wants students to
 
bring their life histories and unique voices into the
 
classroom conversation. But who will hear them? Is he giving
 
us the parental advise: "Do as I say, not as I do?" I think
 
he is.
 
There is another way to approach argumentative writing
 
that is not full of this paradox of establishing "common
 
ground" on a patch of earth that is your staked out
 
territory and the rules, your rules. There is a blindness
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inheirent in what both SpeiinieYar and Owens do when they
 
complain about what goes on in Composition Studies. An
 
antidota to thisv anti-diSQhrsive discursivity is■NeitzsGha. : 
NaitzsGha's iifa and writing illustratas tha cohtinuing hopa 
tor us all to find a privata language that will speak to 
, othaf'S.- ' ' 
Nietzsche's Perspectivism 
Ona of the complaints that; bpth spallmiayer and Owens 
have about the teaching of academic writing is that we mean 
for our studehts to use argumentatiye writing in a 
mendacious Way. Argument is a genre that is highly raspectad 
as the bedrock of our academic and social practice. We learn 
to argue a position early in our education, and in an 
adversarial society both men and women are valued for their 
skill at argumentation. This behavior cannot be too bad if 
the rules of this game are set out before hand and all 
participants are aware of them. Owens describes this 
awareness this way; 
There are indeed significant differences between 
rhetorical usage that willingly adopts an 
adversarial tone in order to confirm some 
argument, and that of the writer (or collective of 
writers) who undermine authority by exposing its 
presence, weakening its influence by encouraging a 
range of conflicting observations within the same 
text, thereby problematizing any writer's (or
reader's) ability to 'claim' authority. Since 
there are circumstances that make both poles
worthwhile, there's value in exposing writers to 
both ends of the spectrum(131). 
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But this rarely happens. The very secret of our rhetorical
 
practice is to hide the fact that we are playing at one side
 
of the argument and that the other can be just as viable.
 
Debating competitions are a way of domesticating this energy
 
making people expert at it. But the fact still remains: we
 
push the truth out in front of us as we go, hoping no one
 
will discover our trick.
 
As we are taught to use the skill of argument against
 
others; we find that we are the victims of it ourselves. The
 
truth as someone sees it oppresses us daily. Since this has
 
been an age old pedagogical tool we are taught, by those who
 
have learned the "truth" from those who have taught it to
 
them and so on. This kind of truth, made from argumentation,
 
is built to last; it is the stuff of dogma as both Carse and
 
Benjamin point out.
 
The antidote for this as Spellmeyer and Owens suggest
 
is to infuse writing practice with personal knowledge and a
 
style that reflects the transparency of the language. Not
 
that we should not argue our position; we must. But how do
 
we argue it with all the other positions thrusting forward
 
and obscuring the sky? If every position, every
 
interpretation of the facts becomes possible, how are we to
 
say ours is right? For Nietzsche it is all in one's
 
perspective.
 
Nietzsche confronts dogma, Alexander Nehamas says in
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Nietzsche: Life as Literature, with "'genealogy,' for
 
genealogy reveals the very particular, very interested
 
origins from which actually emerge the views that we have
 
forgotten are views and take instead as facts"(32). The
 
problem is that if all views have their origins and are seen
 
to have been created for practical reasons, then these
 
motives can be called into question. Even the view that
 
every view is also suspect, is suspect. Nehamas notes that
 
Nietzsche openly acknowledges this paradox: "When, having
 
attacked the mechanistic interpretation of physics, he
 
presents his own hypothesis of the will to power and
 
concludes, 'Supposing that this is also only interpretation­
-and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—Well,
 
so much the better'"(35). But then how does this not sink
 
into base relativism—one view as good as another? Nietzsche
 
seems to "escapes" this paradox by constantly varying the
 
writing styles he practiced.
 
Nietzsche used many different styles within types of
 
discourse throughout his life that Nehemas catalogs for us:
 
"the aphorism," "notes," "(... 'fragments')," "essays,"
 
"'epic,'" "monologue," "scholarly philological treatise,"
 
"polemical pamphlet," "autobiography," "lyrics," and the
 
"vast number of letters"(18). When Neitzsche writes in so
 
many different ways, using different styles, it suggests
 
"that there is no single, neutral language in which his
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views/ or any other, can ever te presented. His constaht
 
Stylistic presence shows that theories are as various and
 
idiosyncratic as the writing in which they are
 
embodied"(37), Thet tbis constant changing of styles gives
 
the reader pause is the point. if we become practiced at
 
reading different styles for not only what they say but how 
they are saying it/ then we are never sedtced to the fact 
"that some views at least are independent of style''(37). 
What we see, then, are the effects of personality on the 
contents of a world, and writing used as a tool to construct 
self and at the same time propel it, like a bundle of texts 
along a trajectory, in a personal and intentional way. In 
other words, we are enjoined to make a writing that is self 
referential and at the same time attempts to build knowledge 
outside the realms of polished truths that have been handed 
down by less observant readers and writers as never changing 
truth. ■' ■ ' ­
When I think about teaching in the context of what 
Nietzsche does I am reminded of a quote from Heidegger that 
Spellmeyer uses: "Teaching is more difficult than learning 
because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn." (CG 
210) "To let learn" entails not enforcing our one true style 
on our students. That they must choose a style (within the 
academy) is analogous to choosing a self to operate in this 
world. Many of us never do this; it is imposed on us. 
Spellmeyer in reply to one of his critics quotes Terry 
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Eagletqn: "the privilege b1- the ppphesqor /i^ privilege v :
 
to deciide what he shall be; it is this aright which the
 
oppressed must demand too, which must be universalized"(CE
 
55,91) The Steve character in the movie The Thomas Crown
 
Affaire is asked by his girlfriend after coming down from
 
flying a glider why he is not worried about killing himself.
 
"The only thing I worry about," he says, "is who I will be
 
tomorrow." All our students have the chance to be someone
 
tomorrow if we can let them learn what it means to write
 
themselves into their own scripts and not impose ours upon
 
them.
 
IV. Pedagogy/Motivation
 
Myth, Feminism, and Voice
 
Voice has been viewed traditionally as a single
 
material thing. I have been talking about it as multiple
 
(Dennett), as an emanation of being; what we do, instead of
 
what we are. Voice is not a static piece of soul-furniture,
 
to be dusted off and used when we feel the need to hear our
 
most familiar self; instead, voice like self is a plural
 
form. I have also tried to build voice into my idea of myth-

making as method. Myth-making is an embodied action; it
 
results in a person becoming the consequences of their
 
actions. However, there is rarely any integration of the
 
notion of myth—making ——how it is done. The insight that we
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are formed by the stories we tell is lost on those who feel
 
helpless in response to our modern technological culturew
 
But I am convinced that the practice of myth-making
 
represents the ability to make multiple selves in order to
 
deal with the mysteries of the human condition. Writing
 
helps us do this. It has been my purpose in this thesis to
 
present a myth of the writing classroom where multiple
 
selves can be generated, where both student and teacher can
 
play at writing so what they say will have real significance
 
for them. I return again to the powerful voice of William
 
Carlos Williams and his "self," Red Eric. The classroom
 
should be a place where we can cdrafortably be "in
 
Greenland," while struggling to go beyond it^ •
 
Both feminism and psychoanalysis has helped me see the 
kind of work that needs to be done in our own private 
Greenlands. These critical positions both say important 
things for the writing class and how and why we should make 
voice. I believe it has everything to do with what I have 
been saying about myth-making. In the following reflection 
on voice, I want to bring feminism and psychoanalysis to 
bear on Composition theory. In Composition, voice usually 
appears as a mysterious artifact —■ a particular 
metaphysical notion. 
Peter Elbow and many feminists> 
voice is a rallying cry against traditionalists in 
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Composition. The talk about voice is usually against the
 
teacher imposed voice of the institution. The student has a
 
voice, sometimes deep down, unexpressed, that according to
 
the Expressivists and some feminists, the
 
teacher/establishment is trying to subvert. On the other
 
hand, the Social Constructivists believe the student's voice
 
must give way to the instructor's wish that students arrive
 
at a working academic voice. Others are not so clear cut
 
about the place of voice and how it should be used. They
 
leave off talking about it altogether because it cannot be
 
pinned down. One who speaks of it in a more pro-active
 
context is Laurie Finke.
 
Finke in an article in College English ("Knowledge as
 
Bait: Feminism, Voice, and the Pedagogical Unconscious")
 
uses the psychoanalytical term "transference"^'^ to position
 
herself in this debate. First, she redefines the feminist
 
idea of coming-to-voice: "The process feminist pedagogy
 
seeks to describe is not the student's discovering a voice
 
that is already there, but her fashioning one from the
 
discursive environment through and in which the feminist
 
subject emerges"(14). She uses Lacan and his idea of the
 
"subject," and how it "more fully captures the sense of
 
subjection, of the self's fashioning by its insertion into
 
"... love for the parent which is successively
 
transferred to other objects, to teachers or the analyst"
 
(Freud 18).
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an already articulated symbolic economy" to break free from
 
an essentialist position that most feminists find themselves
 
in. She finds herself and her students in a more political
 
and vulnerable position within the dynamics of the classroom
 
by locating her own feminist ideology within the
 
conversation going on in the classroom between student and
 
teacher. This place, this classroom, is an inevitable matrix
 
of power that is not easily negotiated for either teacher or
 
student, especially when we demand that it be a free zone.
 
Freedom is more easily given then performed. As Finke
 
admits the best intentions of the most radical teachers are
 
subverted by the resistance of students. The problem becomes
 
again one of voice. We want them to acquire a voice, but it
 
is too often true that it is the voice we have assumed they
 
will have, and not the voice they chose to have. This is
 
where the psychoanalytic idea of transference plays a
 
pivotal role.
 
If, following post-structuralist Lacanian theory, voice
 
appears within the discursive interchanges of the classroom,
 
it is tethered to the writing our students do for us. What
 
our students chose to write, however, depends on what they
 
bring to the classroom and how it is dealt with there. What
 
Finke "teases out" of the dynamic of transference in the
 
classroom is "possible only within a highly unequal
 
relationship"!18) such as the one between teacher and
 
student. This exchange, described by Lacan as "love directed
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toward, addressed to, knowledge"(18), is the "bait" Finke
 
talks about, that serves the trap of identification with the
 
teacher. However, it is often tripped by the student's
 
resistance to the teacher's authority. This resistance
 
appears when the teacher disturbs the student's sense of a
 
unified self. Both knowledge and desire, as it is directed
 
at us, always precede resistance. Teaching with an awareness
 
of transference allows us to break down a student's initial
 
representation of voice and allows it to be reconfigured in
 
response to the collision of desire/knowledge. That is, when
 
they see you as a person who happens to be a teacher, and
 
not as their father, their priest, their high school
 
teacher, or whomever .... That is the moment they break the
 
myth and a voice appears. This is not always a happy
 
"accident." It is full of risk as we have been saying.
 
Finke's talk of voice and transference has many links
 
to my thinking about myth and motivation to write. She
 
describes a place where both student and teacher have to
 
come to grips with what will be written. Will the teacher
 
"let learn," and will the student break the received myth to
 
establish one that is charmed from the incantation of words
 
swirling around the circle of trees within which they sit
 
and write.
 
It is not enough for the teacher to observe like
 
Peisinoe must have done when Harmony began to fall in love
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with Cadmus, fall in love with the abstract idea of love. We
 
must be mythographers of our own myths, that is, we must see
 
our own Harmony-falling-in-love-with-her-friend's-desire as
 
we write it out. If we see in the outline of our own motives
 
to create the desire to do the work of writing, we can
 
produce the needed change for us to flourish. We cannot
 
maintain ourselves on the stale bread of someone else's
 
words; we must make our own. And it is comforting to believe
 
that we do not have to pull up a voice already prepared for
 
us but have a chance to fashion one anew every day out of
 
the desires we are given. When we know this about our
 
writing practice, writing becomes play.
 
What kind of pedagogical practices will motivate our
 
students to write? We need to prepare a place where they can
 
watch themselves fall in love with writing. Where the
 
pleasure of coming to voice can be repeated over and over
 
again. Where myths are- broken and rebuilt and the very
 
dynamic of our actions can expand unimpeded. Most of all the
 
writing we do in the classroom should be generative and
 
playful. Assignments should flow in and out of one another.
 
Students should be able to follow their noses and at the
 
same time should work the forms to see themselves more
 
clearly there.
 
My myth of the writing classroom reflects how those who
 
produced the ancient myth's narrative centuries ago took it
 
from their own bodies. Likewise, my students will build
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their myth/text in the garden of their bodies and mirror the
 
creation to themselves. To do this I set off with them in a
 
boat without oars like the peregrinl, on a sea — their
 
writing practice —-where they eventually find their voices
 
in Greenland, there to the West.
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